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I.  INTRODUCTION: WHAT VOSBURG V. PUTNEY CAN TEACH US ABOUT THE MODERN 
LAW OF EXPERT EVIDENCE 
Virtually every first year American law student learns the case of Vosburg v. 
Putney.1  As one commentator has put it, “Vosburg v. Putney has, upon years of 
dedicated service in many capacities, achieved within the realm of torts a distinction 
it shares with a small circle of other Anglo-American cases . . . .”2  It is hardly 
surprising that Vosburg has become perhaps one of the most celebrated tort cases in 
American law: Wrapped within its elegantly simple fact pattern3 are fundamental 
questions of intent, comparative negligence, and proximate causation.4   
What is arguably surprising, however, is that Vosburg has been taught 
exclusively as a “torts” case, with little to no attention having been paid to the case’s 
profound lessons on the relationship between “substantive” tort law and the 
“procedural” law of expert evidence.  After all, the Vosburg jury was not left 
unassisted in determining whether the defendant’s “slight” kick to the shin of the 
plaintiff was the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s debilitating bone injury.  Rather, at 
trial the jury heard significant expert testimony on the causation-in-fact question.  On 
the one hand, the plaintiff introduced the testimony of Doctors Joshua Bacon and 
Hugo Philler, the plaintiff’s treating physicians.  Each testified that, in their expert 
medical opinion, the “exciting cause of [the bone destruction] was the application of 
some force (a kick or a blow) to [the plaintiff’s] leg.”5  Specifically, Dr. Philler 
testified that, although the plaintiff’s “medical history indicated heightened 
susceptibility to infectious diseases,” he “had spotted nothing to persuade him that 
                                                                
1
 Vosburg v. Putney, 56 N.W. 480 (Wis. 1893) (holding that defendant, who lightly but 
intentionally kicked a fellow student on the shin, was fully liable for the unforeseeable bone 
destruction resulting from the kick).  At Harvard Law School, Vosburg was the first case I was 
assigned to read in my first-year Torts class. 
2
 See Zigurds L. Zile, Vosburg v. Putney: A Centennial Story, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 877, 988 
(1992). 
3
 The facts of Vosburg are as follows: 
The plaintiff was about 14 years of age, and the defendant about 11 years of age.  On 
[February 20, 1889], they were sitting opposite to each other across an aisle in the high 
school of . . . Waukesha.  The defendant reached across the aisle with his foot, and hit 
with his toe the shin of the right leg of the plaintiff.  The touch was slight.  The 
plaintiff did not feel it . . . .  In a few moments he felt a violent pain in [his right shin], 
which caused him to cry out loudly.  The next day he was sick and had to be helped to 
school.  On the fourth day [after,] he was vomiting . . . . There was a slight 
discoloration of the skin entirely over the inner surface of the tibia an inch below the 
bend of the knee. . . .  [O]n the 8th of March an operation was performed on the limb 
by making an incision, and a moderate amount of pus escaped. . . .  On the sixth day 
after this, another incision was made to the bone, and it was found that destruction was 
going on in the bone, and so it has continued exfoliating pieces of bone.  [The 
plaintiff] will never recover the use of the limb.  There were black and blue spots on 
the shin bone, indicating that there had been a blow.   
Vosburg v. Putney, 47 N.W. 99, 99 (Wis. 1890).  
4
 See, e.g., Robert Rabin, Preface Vosburg v. Putney in Three-Part Disharmony, 1992 
WIS. L. REV. 863, 864-65 (1992) (“What better introduction to the subtleties of tort law?”). 
5
 Zile, supra note 2, at 959.    
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[the plaintiff] would have developed osteomyelitis whether or not force had been 
applied” to the plaintiff’s leg.6  Dr. Philler concluded that the plaintiff’s bone 
“disease began as osteomyelitis . . . within the bone marrow” and that although “the 
infectious material traveled to the tibia from the inadequately treated and poorly 
healing wound above the knee” sustained in an earlier accident involving an axe, 
“‘such disastrous results should [not] have occurred without a secondary 
traumatism.’”7  On the other hand, the defendant introduced at least four medical 
experts in rebuttal, who collectively testified that although “[s]ome cause was 
necessary to localize osteomyelitis,” bone growth “was the most common cause.”8   
It is hard to say definitively whether a relatively light kick to the shin could have 
been9 the “exciting cause” of young Vosburg’s “localized osteomyelitis” of the tibia.  
But, this is beside the point.  Modern evidentiary standards do not allow the 
admission of a causation-in-fact expert whenever there is a non-zero possibility that 
the expert’s opinion is correct.  In other words, the question is not whether the expert 
has established a non-zero possibility of a causal connection between the defendant’s 
act and the plaintiff’s injury.10  Rather, the relevant question is whether the testimony 
of the expert is sufficiently “reliable” to warrant admission to the jury.     
The opinions of Drs. Bacon and Philler were based on the “germ or microbe 
theory of disease,” which hypothesized that all bone inflammation and disease was 
caused by the presence of pus-forming germs that needed an “exciting cause” of 
some sort to grow and become harmful in the body.11  At the turn of the twentieth 
century, germ theory was “still but grudgingly received by American medical 
science.”12  Moreover, neither Drs. Bacon nor Philler were able to cite to any studies 
                                                                
6
  Id. at 960. 
7
  Id. 
8
  Id. at 961.  
9
 The qualifying phrase “could be” sounds in terms of “general causation.”  See, e.g., In re 
Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 292 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that 
general causation refers to “whether the substance at issue had the capacity to cause the harm 
alleged, while ‘individual causation’ refers to whether a particular individual suffers from a 
particular ailment as a result of exposure to a substance”). 
10
 If an expert can reliability testify only to a possibility of a causal connection, then it will 
be excluded as failing the second prong, or “fit” requirement, of the Rule 702 analysis.  See, 
e.g., Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1398 (D. Or. 1996) (“[T]he plaintiffs 
in this litigation must prove not merely the possibility of a causal connection between breast 
implants and the alleged systemic disease, but the medical probability of a causal connection.  
Under this substantive standard, if an expert cannot state the causal connection in terms of 
probability or certainty, the expert’s testimony must be excluded under the second prong of 
Rule 702.”).  Professor Berger has previously remarked on this phenomenon of incorporating 
sufficiency of the evidence standards directly into the admissibility inquiry.  See Margaret A. 
Berger, Upsetting the Balance Between Adverse Interests: The Impact of the Supreme Court’s 
Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Litigation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 323-
25 (2001) [hereinafter Berger, Upsetting the Balance].  
11Zile, supra note 2, at 912.  Doctors Bacon and Philler appeared to believe that virtually 
anything could be an “exciting cause”—for example, a physical blow, exposure to cold or 
dampness, malnutrition, or overexertion.  See id. at 913.  
12
 Id. at 912.   
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or experiments tending to show that a light blow could cause a rapid destruction of 
bone, even a bone left vulnerable by a latent bacterial infection.  Indeed even today, 
the relationship between trauma and bacterial induced bone deterioration is not well 
known.13   
All of this considered, it is likely that, if Vosburg occurred today, a trial court 
applying the so-called “Dabuert standard”—the prevailing standard for the 
admission of expert evidence in federal court and the courts of a majority of the 
states14—would find that the opinions of Drs. Bacon and Philler were not based upon 
a reliable methodology and, accordingly, would be inadmissible.15     
Of course, the Vosburg case was litigated over one hundred years prior to the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals—and 
preceded even Frye v. United States16 by over thirty years.  Without strict 
admissibility standards for expert evidence yet in place, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court offered a terse response to the defendant’s challenge to the admissibility of the 
opinions of Drs. Bacon and Philler:   
The only remaining assignment of error is that the court erred in 
permitting medical witness to give their opinions as to what was the 
exciting cause of the injury to Andrew [Vosburg].  We think that it was a 
proper subject for expert testimony, and hence that the error is not well 
assigned.17   
Indeed, earlier in the litigation, in an opinion reversing a verdict in favor of Vosburg 
on other grounds, the Wisconsin Supreme Court offered a similar view:   
It is a very strange and extraordinary case.  The [kick] would seem to be 
very slight for so great and serious a consequence [as occurred].  And yet 
                                                                
13
 See Raymond T. Morrissy & Darrel W. Haynes, Acute Hematogenous Osteomyelitis: A 
Model With Trauma as an Etiology, 9 J. OF PEDIATRIC ORTHOPAEDICS 447, 455 (1989).  
14
 See, e.g., Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer & Stephen P. Anway, Biotechnology and the 
Bar: A Response to the Growing Divide Between Science and the Legal Environment, 22 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 671, 715 (2007) (recognizing that “[m]ost state courts have adopted the 
Daubert standard to determine the admissibility of scientific evidence . . . .”).   
15
 See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court recently noted that it has not yet adopted the Daubert standard (which governs 
in federal court) as the governing standard in its own state courts.  See Conley Publ’g Group 
Ltd. v. Journal Commc’ns, Inc., 665 N.W.2d 879, 892-93 (Wis. 2003); see also Green v. 
Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 617 N.W.2d 881, 890-91 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that 
“[u]nder Wisconsin law, scientific testimony is admissible if it is an aid to the jury or reliable 
enough to be probative,” though explaining that “[a]n opinion for which there is no proper 
foundation . . . is not reliable enough to be probative” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see 
also Andrew R. Stolfi, Why Illinois Should Abandon Frye’s General Acceptance Standard for 
the Admission of Novel Scientific Evidence, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 861, 898 n.225 (2003) 
(noting that forty-five states have codified the federal Rule 702 or its equivalent). 
16
 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that expert evidence is 
admissible only if based on a methodology that has “gained general acceptance” in the 
relevant scientific community), overruled in part by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 
U.S. 579 (1993). 
17
 Vosburg v. Putney, 56 N.W. 480, 480 (Wis. 1893).   
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the plaintiff’s limb might have been in just that condition when such a 
slight blow would excite and cause such a result, according to the medical 
testimony.  That there is great uncertainty about the case cannot be denied.  
But perfect certainty is not required.  It is sufficient that it is the opinion 
of the expert medical witnesses that such a [kick] might produce such a 
result under peculiar circumstances, and that the jury had a right to find . . 
. that it did.18   
The premise of the passage above is that the reliability of an expert’s opinion is 
not for the court to decide, even as a threshold matter.  Though that premise was 
consistent with the then-prevailing law, it is radically inconsistent with the modern 
jurisprudence of expert evidence and, in particular, Daubert.  And this leads to an 
important insight: If Vosburg were litigated today, there might well be no Vosburg.  
The causation proffers of Drs. Bacon and Philler would be deemed inadmissible, and 
the trial court would accordingly grant Putney’s motion for summary judgment.19   
A modern scholar might regard the jury’s verdict in Vosburg as proof that the 
combination of “junk science” and a sympathetic plaintiff is a powerful elixir.  Why 
then is Vosburg not viewed as a paradigmatic example of the importance of a court’s 
gatekeeping role with respect to expert evidence?  One answer, to be sure, is that the 
admissibility issue in Vosburg is an anomaly of history, a result of an anachronistic 
legal regime that gave juries carte blanche to distinguish good science from bad.  
But, the better answer is that the verdict in Vosburg is regarded as “right”—not so 
much because it represents a factually correct determination of what actually caused 
Vosburg’s catastrophic injury, but rather because it represents a socially acceptable 
outcome between the parties: Putney acted as a social deviant and therefore has no 
real basis to complain about being held liable for Vosburg’s injury.  Because the 
outcome of the case is regarded as “right”—the term “rough justice” comes to 
mind—one scarcely pays attention to the fact that Vosburg’s case rested on dubious 
expert opinions. 
The lesson that might be drawn is this: The greater the perceived reprehensibility 
of the defendant’s conduct, the less the legal system hesitates to allow the jury to 
speculate regarding causation-in-fact.20  In the Vosburg case, despite a strong 
intuition that a light kick simply could not have caused such a seriously destructive 
bone injury, one is not all that uncomfortable with the jury’s verdict—or, more 
accurately, the trial court’s decision to allow the jury reach that verdict because (1) 
there was evidence that Putney’s conduct was morally depraved—that is to say, 
devoid of any social benefit and ostensibly taken only to harass and annoy Vosburg; 
                                                                
18
 See Vosburg v. Putney, 47 N.W. 99, 99 (Wis. 1890). 
19
 See JoEllen Lind, “Procedural Swift”: Complex Litigation Reform, State Tort Law, and 
Democratic Values, 37 AKRON L. REV. 717, 772-73 (2004) (“It has become commonplace for 
federal courts to conduct a ‘Daubert hearing’ to test the admissibility of plaintiffs’ crucial 
expert opinions early on in litigation; when the evidence is ruled inadmissible . . . a successful 
defense motion for summary judgment typically follows.”). 
20
 See Robert Cooter, Torts as the Union of Liberty and Efficiency: An Essay on 
Causation, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 523, 524 (1987).  As Professor Cooter writes, “Causation in 
tort law is, thus, a way of describing the point where personal freedom runs out and 
responsibility to others begins . . . .  Deciding issues of causation in tort law requires an appeal 
to substantive values like liberty and efficiency.”  Id.    
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and (2) there was at least a non-zero possibility that the Putney’s unlawful act was 
the cause-in-fact of the Vosburg’s injury.21   
The jury’s speculation, based only on dubious expert testimony, that Putney’s 
kick caused Vosburg’s injury does not draw objection because it is consistent with 
Professor Malone’s classic observation that where the defendant has violated an 
“exacting” rule of law that rests on “time-honored moral considerations,” he “will be 
held responsible for any harm that can be causally associated in any plausible way 
with his wrongdoing.”22  Malone observed that in such circumstances, “[t]he court . . 
. will seldom hesitate to allow the jury a free range of speculation on the cause issue 
at the expense of an intentional wrongdoer who is charged with having physically 
injured another person.”23  Moreover, to the extent that Putney’s behavior served no 
ascertainable social utility,24 allowing the jury to impose liability on Putney is 
consistent with legal economists’ view of the causation-in-fact element.25 
And, yet, Vosburg arguably is inconsistent with the current majority standard for 
the admissibility of expert evidence.  Under that standard, a trial court would exclude 
the type of novel, speculative causation-in-fact testimony that Vosburg’s experts 
proffered, which would ultimately lead to summary judgment being granted in favor 
of the defendant.26   
This Article argues that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Daubert and Joiner 
imply an approach to the reliability, and hence admissibility, of causation experts 
                                                                
21
 See Christopher H. Schroeder, Rights Against Risks, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 495, 500 (1986) 
(recognizing that if there is a non-zero possibility that A can cause B, if A is sufficiently 
repeated, eventually it will in fact cause B).  The more unlawful the defendant’s conduct, the 
more we are willing to assume that such conduct is empty of any social benefit.  Indeed, if 
there is a non-zero possibility that the defendant’s conduct actually caused the plaintiff’s 
injury, that conduct is per se Pareto inefficient unless there is no ascertainable social benefit to 
the defendant’s conduct.  One who is of the view that the goal of tort law is to promote social 
efficiency should conclude that, all other things equal, it is better to over- rather than under-
deter conduct that serves no social benefit and that, accordingly, the causation-in-fact 
“burden” should be significantly relaxed in such circumstances.   
22
 Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 72-73 (1956). 
23
 Id. at 72-73. 
24
 See RICHARD A. POSNER, TORT LAW: CASES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 27 (1982) 
(“Perhaps [Vosburg] should have worn a shinguard.  But . . . the costs of the shinguard must 
be compared with the cost to [Putney] of not kicking [Vosburg.]  The latter cost was 
presumably low—even negative.”).   
25
 Cooter, supra note 20, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. at 540 (“In this tradition, if efficiency 
requires holding the defendant liable, he is said to have caused the accident, but not otherwise 
. . . . ‘Cause’ is reduced to ‘efficiency’ in the sense that the ascription of legal cause is wholly 
dependent upon the judgment of economic efficiency . . . .  Saying the defendant caused the 
accident means . . . that [economic] efficiency requires holding him liable.”). 
26
 The Daubert standard, which has essentially been codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 
702 as amended in 2000, has been adopted by approximately thirty states, although the “exact 
number is difficult to determine.”  Cara Gitlin, Note, Expert Testimony on Child Sexual Abuse 
Accommodation Syndrome, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 497, 503 n.45 (2008).  For the sake of 
simplicity, for the remainder of this paper, I treat Daubert as setting forth the applicable 
analysis for expert admissibility.   
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that conflicts with the way in which courts traditionally had determined whether to 
allow the jury to speculate on uncertain causation-in-fact questions.  Largely moving 
past the debate of whether Daubert and Joiner set the admissibility bar too high or 
low, the Article instead criticizes the decisions on the ground that they suggest that 
the height of the reliability bar is static and should not be adjusted depending upon 
the circumstances of the defendant’s possibly injurious conduct.  Under the “all-or-
nothing” liability rule, the exclusion of a plaintiff’s expert causation evidence will 
necessarily result in under-deterrence.  Conversely, the admission of a plaintiff’s 
questionable expert will necessarily expose a defendant to potential liability for harm 
that, from a probabilistic perspective, it did not cause.  This Article thus critiques the 
static bar approach from a deterrence perspective and argues that the nature of the 
defendant’s conduct should be a factor in a court’s determination of whether a 
plaintiff’s causation expert’s proffer is sufficiently reliable to warrant admission at 
trial. 
Part II reviews the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert and its subsequent 
decision in General Electric Co. v. Joiner.27  By linking “evidentiary reliability” with 
scientific validity, the Court’s opinions in those cases imply a “static bar approach” 
to admissibility.28  Part III proposes that, instead of a static reliability bar, a “moving 
bar approach” allowing the court to adjust the height of the reliability bar in response 
to the defendant’s possibly injurious conduct would be more consistent with tort 
law’s traditional treatment of causation-in-fact and more likely to achieve 
economically efficient deterrence.  Part IV discusses some paradigmatic cases in 
which a moving bar approach might alter admissibility outcomes.  Part V offers and 
responds to several potential objections to the moving bar approach.  
II.  THE INTERSECTION OF SCIENCE AND LAW: THE DAUBERT AND  
GENERAL ELECTRIC V. JOINER DECISIONS 
In this section, the author discusses the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and its subsequent opinion in 
General Electric v. Joiner.  The author argues that by linking admissibility with the 
concept of scientific validity, these decisions suggest that the degree of reliability 
that must be demonstrated of a causation expert’s proffer is not case specific.  
Rather, the height of the reliability bar is “static.” 
A.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
Between 1957 and 1983, approximately thirty million pregnant women were 
prescribed Merrell Dow’s drug Bendectin to relieve symptoms of morning sickness, 
including nausea and vomiting.29  In the mid-1970s, there arose anecdotal-based 
                                                                
27
 General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
28
 Perhaps the simplest way to explain what I mean by “static reliability threshold” is to 
imagine that any expert opinion is given a reliability score that is measured in terms of 
scientific validity.  When the reliability threshold is static, the reliability score that is required 
of any expert remains the same from case to case, regardless of the underlying facts or the 
nature of the suit.  Professor Imwinkelried has used the phrases “invariant reliability 
threshold” and “uniform, minimum reliability level” to describe this.  Edward J. Imwinkelried, 
The Relativity of Reliability, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 269, 269 (2003).  
29
 Merrell Dow Pharms. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 708 (Tex. 1997). 
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concerns of a link between Bendectin and birth defects.  Although more than thirty 
scientific studies had failed to demonstrate any such link, and although the FDA 
never revoked its approval of Bendectin, a rash of products liability suits ensued 
against Merrell Dow.  “In virtually all the Bendectin litigation, the central issue [had] 
been the scientific reliability of the expert testimony offered to establish causation.”30  
It was against this backdrop that the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.  Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller were born with 
serious birth defects.  Each of their mothers had used Bendectin during her first 
trimester of each pregnancy.  Jason, Eric, and their parents filed a products liability 
suit in federal court against Merrell Dow alleging that Bendectin had caused their 
birth defects.31  “After extensive discovery, [Merrell Dow] moved for summary 
judgment, contending that Bendectin [did] not cause birth defects in humans and that 
[Daubert and Schuller were] unable to come forward with any admissible evidence 
that it [did].”32  Merrell Dow’s expert, a physician and credentialed epidemiologist 
named Dr. Steven Lamm, testified that over thirty studies had found Bendectin to 
pose no risk of birth defects and that no study had ever found Bendectin to be a 
human terotagen.33    
Daubert and Schuller did not contest Merrell Dow’s experts’ “characterization of 
the published record regarding Bendectin.  Instead, they responded . . . with the 
testimony of eight experts of their own, each of whom also possessed impressive 
credentials.”34  Based upon animal studies, chemical analyses, and re-analyses of 
previous human subject Bendectin studies, these experts had “concluded that 
Bendectin can cause birth defects.”35 
Over the plaintiffs’ objections, the district court excluded their experts’ proposed 
testimony, holding that the experts’ opinions were based upon analyses that had not 
been published or peer reviewed, thus precluding their admission under Federal Rule 
of Evidence 702.36  The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the same grounds.37 
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court vacated the decision below.  The 
Court held that “[n]othing in the text of [Rule 702] establishes ‘general acceptance’ 
as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility.”38  Indeed, the Court explained that such 
a prerequisite “would be at odds with the ‘liberal thrust’ of the Federal Rules and 
                                                                
30
 Id.  The cost of defending the suits ultimately became so burdensome that Merrell Dow 
voluntarily withdrew Bendectin from the market in 1983.  Id. 
31
 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 582 (1993). 
32
 Id. 
33
 Id. 
34
 Id. at 584. 
35
 Id. at 583. 
36
 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 727 F. Supp. 570, 576 (S.D. Cal. 1989). 
37
 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 951 F.2d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991).  The Ninth 
Circuit added that, because the plaintiffs’ experts’ testimony had been prepared “solely for 
litigation,” it would be scrutinized especially heavily.  See id. 
38
 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587. 
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their ‘general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to ‘opinion’ testimony.”39  
The Court held that Rule 702 requires only that “scientific testimony or evidence . . . 
[be] relevant [and] reliable.”40  Still, although the district court had erred in imposing 
a general acceptance prerequisite, the Court made it clear that district judges must 
continue to act as gate keepers to ensure that all “scientific testimony” be “derived 
by the scientific method.”41   
In articulating the contours of Rule 702’s general reliability standard, the Court 
stated that the inquiry should be “a flexible one,” and it set out a non-exhaustive list 
of non-dispositive indicia of reliability: (1) whether the expert’s conclusion is 
generally falsifiable through empirical testing; (2) whether the studies upon which 
the expert’s opinion is based have been subjected to peer review; (3) whether the 
testing upon which the expert’s opinion is based has a low error rate; and (4) whether 
the expert’s conclusions have received general acceptance within the relevant 
scientific community.42   
Although Daubert superficially appeared to “relax the ‘austere standard’ of the 
older Frye rule,”43 there was immediate disagreement amongst commentators about  
“whether [the opinion] st[ood] for a liberal standard of admissibility or a 
conservative one.”44  Fifteen years later, there is some indication that “Daubert has 
made it harder, not easier, to get scientific testimony admitted.”45  In hindsight, at 
least one element of the Daubert opinion portended this outcome: the Court’s 
linkage of evidentiary reliability—the polestar for admissibility—with the concept of 
scientific validity.  The Court stated that the “overarching subject” of the Rule 702 
admissibility inquiry “is the scientific validity—and thus the evidentiary relevance 
and reliability—of the principles that underlie a proposed [expert] submission”46 and 
that “[i]n a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based 
upon scientific validity.”47  
                                                                
39
 Id. (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)). 
40
 Id. at 589. 
41
 Id. at 590.  “That the Frye test was displaced by the Rules of Evidence does not mean, 
however, that the Rules themselves place no limits on the admissibility of purportedly 
scientific evidence . . . . [T]he trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or 
evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”  Id. at 589. 
42
 See id. at 591-94. 
43
 Susan Haack, Of Truth, in Science and in Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 985, 990 (2008). 
44
 David L. Faigman, Elise Porter & Michael J. Saks, Check Your Crystal Ball at the 
Courthouse Door, Please:  Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying 
About the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1819 (1994). 
45
 Haack, supra note 43, at 990; see also David L. Faigman et al., How Good is Good 
Enough? Expert Evidence Under Daubert and Kumho, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 645, 656 
(2000) (“[T]he move from Frye to Daubert . . . raised the height of the admissibility bar . . . in 
a more complex way than is often appreciated by courts or commentators.”).  
46
 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95. 
47
 Id. at 590 n.9 (emphasis in original); see also Robert J. Goodwin, The Hidden 
Significance of Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael:  A Compass for Problems of Definition and 
Procedure Created by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 603, 
612 (2000) (“Daubert equates ‘evidentiary reliability’ with ‘scientific validity.’”).  Although 
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Regardless of whether it was the Court’s actual intent, the passages imply an 
attempt to “incorporate[] into law a scientific attitude toward selecting scientific 
testimony” 48 and a “move toward a ‘more scientific approach to admissibility.’”49  In 
Professor Feldman’s view, “the Daubert Court adopted an approach to determining 
the admissibility of scientific opinion that reflects scientists’ own approach to 
deciding which information to consider when deciding questions of scientific fact.” 50  
B.  General Electric v. Joiner 
In the short time after the Supreme Court issued its Daubert opinion, it remained 
unclear how deep a change it would work into the law of expert evidence.  At the 
same time, one commentator called Daubert “the most important case involving the 
admissibility of scientific evidence in seventy years.”51  One court took the view that 
“Daubert only prescribe[d] judicial intervention for expert testimony approaching 
the outer boundaries of traditional scientific and technological knowledge.”52  
Professor Joseph Sanders might best have summed up the alternative available 
interpretations of Daubert: “From a narrow perspective, Daubert simply resolved a 
longstanding issue in the law of evidence by holding that the Federal Rules of 
Evidence superseded Frye.  From a wider perspective, the opinion represents an 
attempt to define, or perhaps redefine, the relationship between science and the 
law.”53 
In 1997, the Supreme Court’s opinion in General Electric Co. v. Joiner54 began 
to resolve some of these debates, as well as determine the viability of Daubert’s 
putative “dichotomy between methodology and conclusions.”55  
Robert Joiner began working as an electrician for the city of Thomasville, 
Georgia in 1973.  “This job required him to work with and around the city’s 
                                                          
the Court assured that it would be “unreasonable” to require that “the subject of [an expert’s] 
scientific testimony must be ‘known’ to a certainty” in order to be admissible, this was only 
because “there are no certainties in science.”  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. 
48
 Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation, 74 TEX. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (1995). 
49
 Brian Leiter, The Epistemology of Admissibility: Why Even Good Philosophy of Science 
Would Not Make for Good Philosophy of Evidence, 1997 BYU L. REV. 803, 804 (1997) 
(quoting Feldman, supra note 48, at 1-2). 
50
 Feldman, supra note 48, at 2. 
51
 David E. Bernstein, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence After Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2139, 2139 (1994). 
52
 Lappe v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 857 F. Supp. 222, 228 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that 
Daubert applied only in cases of “novel scientific evidence”) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. 579). 
53
 Joseph Sanders, Scientific Validity, Admissibility, and Mass Torts After Daubert, 78 
MINN. L. REV. 1387, 1440 (1994) (“By placing the concept of scientific validity at the center 
of admissibility decisions, Daubert invoked scientific understandings of what constitutes good 
and bad science.”). 
54
 General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
55
 D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in 
Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5 n.12 
(2002). 
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electrical transformers, which used a mineral-oil-based dielectric fluid as a coolant.  
Joiner often had to stick his hands and arms into the fluid to make repairs,” and the 
fluid would “sometimes splash onto him, occasionally getting into his eyes and 
mouth.”56  “In 1983, the city discovered that the fluid in some of the transformers 
was contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs),”57 which by then had been 
“widely considered to be hazardous to human health” for nearly a decade.58   
In 1991, at the age of 37, Joiner was diagnosed with small cell lung cancer.59    
Joiner filed a lawsuit against General Electric Co., alleging that (1) General Electric 
had manufactured the PCBs that Joiner consistently had come into contact with 
during his years as an electrician; and (2) such exposure had “promoted” his cancer, 
which, but for his exposure to the PCBs, “would not have developed for many years, 
if at all.”60  One of Joiner’s experts, Dr. Arthur Frank, testified that  
[i]t [was] more likely than not, given Mr. Joiner’s limited tobacco use, and 
also considering his second hand tobacco smoke exposure, and given his 
age at the onset of lung cancer, 37 years, that tobacco smoke served only 
as the initiator of the cancer and that some other agent served as the 
promoter of the initiated cells.  It was the promotion of these initiated 
cells which caused Mr. Joiner to be harmed.61 
Another one of his experts, Dr. Arnold Schecter, stated that Joiner’s cancer “was 
causally linked to cigarette smoking and PCB exposure,” including exposure to 
“dioxins and dibenzofurans and related chemicals which frequently are found 
together in transformer fluids.”62  Joiner’s expert, Dr. Daniel Teitelbaum, likewise 
testified that Joiner’s “lung cancer was caused by or contributed to in a significant 
degree by the materials with which he worked.”63 
General Electric challenged the admissibility of Joiner’s experts’ opinions that 
PCBs were capable of causing small cell lung cancer in humans, arguing inter alia 
that “there are no epidemiological studies which show that PCBs cause small cell 
lung cancer in humans” and that Joiner’s experts’ “reliance on [mice] studies” for 
their conclusions was unjustifiable.64  The district court found General Electric’s 
second argument persuasive, finding Joiner’s experts’ reliance on mice studies 
“flawed for several reasons.  First, there are only two studies.  Second, the studies 
                                                                
56
 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 139. 
57
 Id.  In testing its electrical transformers in 1983, the city found that 19.2% of its 
transformers contained hazardous levels of PCBs.  See Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 864 F. Supp. 
1310, 1312-13 (N.D. Ga. 1994). 
58
 Id. (“Congress, with limited exceptions, banned the production and sale of PCBs in 
1978.”). 
59
 Id. at 139. 
60
 Id. at 139-140. 
61
 Joiner, 864 F. Supp. at 1314. 
62
 Id. at 1320-21.  
63
 Id. at 1321. 
64
 Id. at 1322-23. 
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obviously used massive doses of PCBs.”65  The court determined that Joiner’s 
“experts erred in relying on the mice studies to opine that PCBs caused Joiner’s lung 
cancer ‘to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.’”66  The court held that it “need 
not address whether the studies that Plaintiffs’ experts rely upon were conducted in a 
scientific manner, for the studies simply do not support the experts’ position that 
PCBs more probably than not promoted Joiner’s lung cancer . . . . [T]he opinions of 
Plaintiffs’ experts do not rise above ‘subjective belief or unsupported speculation.’”67  
Because the exclusion of his experts left Joiner without any evidence of causation, 
the district court granted summary judgment in favor of General Electric.68   
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision below.69  The court 
described Daubert as having “loosen[ed] the strictures of Frye” in order to “make it 
easier to present legitimate conflicting views of experts for the jury’s 
consideration.”70  Daubert set forth a two-prong test.  “Under the first prong, 
evidentiary reliability, the district court must examine the reasoning or methodology 
underlying the expert opinion,” but the court must “be careful not to cross the line 
between deciding whether the expert’s testimony is based on ‘scientifically valid 
principles’ and deciding upon the correctness of the expert’s conclusions.”71  “Under 
the second prong, relevance, the district court must determine whether the 
methodology or reasoning underlying the expert opinion relates to the issue at hand, 
i.e., whether it assists the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or a fact at 
issue.”72   
Ostensibly applying plenary review, the court of appeals found that Joiner’s 
experts had applied a sufficiently reliable methodology to withstand a Rule 702 
attack:   
In this case, [Joiner’s] experts discussed the studies of at least thirteen 
different researchers, and referred to several reports of the World Health 
Organization that address the question of whether PCBs cause cancer.  
[Joiner’s] experts testified that many of these studies were conducted and 
analyzed to test specific hypotheses about the relationship between PCBs 
and cancer, that many have been published in reputable scientific journals, 
and that they were generated and tested using the scientific method.  In 
ruling [Joiner’s] expert[’s] testimony inadmissible, however, it appears 
that the district court . . . accepted defendants’ criticisms of the 
conclusions reached in those studies, stating that “the studies simply do 
not support the experts’ position that PCBs more probably than not 
                                                                
65
 Id. at 1323. 
66
 Id. at 1324 (quoting Wells v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 615 F. Supp 262, 295 (N.D. Ga. 
1985). 
67
 Id. at 1326. 
68
 See id. at 1327. 
69
 See Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524, 534 (11th Cir. 1996). 
70
 Id. at 530. 
71
 Id. 
72
 Id. 
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promoted Joiner’s lung cancer.”  As Daubert makes clear, the district 
court may not decide whether an expert’s opinions are correct, but merely 
whether the bases supporting the conclusions are reliable.73  
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded.  The Court first held that 
admissibility decisions under Rule 702 are to be reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard.74  The Court next held that “a proper application of the correct 
standard of review here indicates that the District Court did not abuse its discretion” 
in excluding Joiner’s experts.75  The Court rejected Joiner’s argument that the district 
court “committed legal error” in passing upon the reliability of his experts’ 
conclusions rather than merely their methodologies:   
[C]onclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another. 
. . .  [N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires 
a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data 
only by the ipse dixit of the expert.  A court may conclude that there is 
simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion 
proffered.76 
As to whether the district court had abused its discretion in concluding that “the 
studies upon which [Joiner’s] experts relied were not sufficient, whether individually 
or in combination, to support their conclusions that Joiner’s exposure to PCB’s 
contributed to his cancer,” the Supreme Court held that it had not.77  The Court 
described the mice studies as “seemingly far-removed” from the question of whether 
Joiner’s PCB exposure could have caused his specific cancer.78  The Court also 
agreed that the “four epidemiological studies” on which Joiner’s experts relied did 
not purport to establish a causal connection between lung cancer and PCBs and “did 
not support the experts’ conclusion that Joiner’s exposure to PCBs caused his 
cancer.”79 
Justice Breyer concurred in the majority opinion, and Justice Stevens sharply 
dissented.  Justice Breyer’s concurrence emphasized that a trial court’s gatekeeping 
duties “must be exercised with special care” in cases “when law and science 
intersect,” such as in toxic torts cases.80  Because “modern life,” Justice Breyer 
stated, “depends upon the use of artificial or manufactured substances,” trial courts’ 
“Daubert gatekeeping function” helped to “assure that the powerful engine of tort 
liability . . . points toward the right substances and does not destroy the wrong 
ones.”81  Moreover, Justice Breyer concluded that “Daubert’s gatekeeping 
                                                                
73
 Id. at 533 (citation omitted). 
74
 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142-43 (1997). 
75
 Id. at 143. 
76
 Id. at 146. 
77
 Id. at 146-47.  
78
 Id. at 144. 
79
 Id. at 144, 145. 
80
 Id. at 148 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
81
 Id. at 148-49. 
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requirement . . . will help secure the basic objectives of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence; which are . . . the ascertainment of truth and the just determination of the 
proceedings.”82   
Justice Stevens’ dissent agreed with the majority that the district court’s decision 
should have been reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard83 but took the view 
that the district court’s “reliability ruling . . . arguably [was] not faithful to the 
statement in Daubert that ‘the focus, of course, must be solely on the principles and 
methodology, not the conclusions that they generate.’”84  Justice Stevens thought that 
Joiner’s experts had employed “a ‘weight of the evidence’ methodology,” which was 
not “intrinsically ‘unscientific’” or “the sort of ‘junk science’ with which Daubert 
was concerned.”85  In fact, Justice Stevens pointed out, the Environmental Protection 
Agency “uses the same methodology to assess risks, albeit using a somewhat 
different threshold than that required in a trial.”86  All in all, “it would seem that an 
expert could reasonably have concluded that [the various human and animal studies 
in combination] raises an inference that PCBs promote lung cancer.”87 
Joiner “represent[ed] a marked amendment to the content of the reliability 
standard announced in Daubert.”88  As an initial matter, the Court rejected the 
dichotomy between methodology and conclusions, which supplemented Daubert’s 
teeth significantly.  More fundamentally, the case involved a choice between two 
“quite different methodologies in determining issues of causation.”89  On the one 
hand, there is the methodology of “the theoretical scientist, whose mission is to 
search for enduring truths about the state of nature.”90  That is, the question for the 
theoretical scientist is “‘does substance A cause disease B?’”91  On the other hand is 
the methodology of what might be termed “practical scientists,” such as those “who 
advise environmental and public health regulat[ions],” and whose “mission is to 
make predictions about how likely it is that substance A is causing disease B.”92  
Such scientists are in the business of determining whether a causal connection is 
                                                                
82
 Id. at 150. 
83
 Id. at 150 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
84
 Id. at 152. 
85
 Id. at 153. 
86
 Id. at 153-54.  Indeed, the Court explicitly approved of this method of analysis in the 
context of administrative rulemaking in The Benzene Case over a decade earlier.  See Indus. 
Union Dep’t v. API, 448 U.S. 607, 656 (1980) (plurality opinion) (“[S]o long as they are 
supported by a body of reputable scientific thought, [OSHA] is free to use conservative 
assumptions in interpreting the data with respect to carcinogens, risking error on the side of 
overprotection rather than underprotection.”). 
87
 Id. at 154. 
88
 Michael H. Gottesman, From Barefoot to Daubert to Joiner: Triple Play or Double 
Error?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 766 (1998) [hereinafter Gottesman, Triple Play]. 
89
 Id. 
90
 Id. 
91
 Id. at 769.  
92
 Id. 
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“likelier than not,” and they utilize the “weight of the evidence” methodology to 
reach their conclusions.93  Rather than searching for some inherent truth, these 
scientists engage in traditional cost-benefit calculus.94 
As a matter of precedent, the Court’s opinion in Joiner left open the possibility 
that it is not an abuse of discretion to admit the practical scientist’s “weight of the 
evidence” methodology—and, indeed, might not have been an abuse of discretion to 
admit Joiner’s expert evidence.  However, the tone of the Court’s opinion at least 
carried with it an implication that the weight of the evidence methodology is, as a 
matter of law, insufficiently reliable under Rule 702.95  After all, it characterized the 
opinions of Joiner’s experts as “connected to existing data only by [their] ipse 
dixit.”96  Moreover, the weight of the evidence approach is designed to allow a risk 
assessor to reach cost-benefit conclusions, rather than to “ascertain the truth” of 
whether the defendant’s actions were causally connected to the plaintiff’s injuries.  
The approach therefore does not fit comfortably with Justice Breyer’s concurrence, 
which emphasized the “ascertainment of truth” as one of the two primary objectives 
of the Rules of Evidence.97  This might be why lower courts post-Joiner have 
explicitly adopted the view that Rule 702 requires a much higher degree of scientific 
certainty than that required for ex ante regulatory action.98 
                                                                
93
 Id.  
94
 Id. 
95
 See Harvey Brown, Eight Gates for Expert Witnesses, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 743, 845 
(1999). 
96
 Gen. Elec. Co., 522 U.S. at 146. 
97
 Id. at 150.  It is interesting to compare Justice Breyer’s concurrence and its emphasis on 
“ascertainment of truth” with Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  
In Ferebee, the D.C. Circuit stated that 
a cause-effect relationship need not be clearly established by animal or 
epidemiological studies before a doctor can testify that, in his opinion, such a 
relationship exists.  As long as the basic methodology employed to reach such a 
conclusion is sound, such as the use of tissue samples, standard tests, and patient 
examination, products liability law does not preclude recovery until a “statistically 
significant” number of people have been injured or until science has had the time and 
resources to complete sophisticated laboratory studies of the chemical.  In a 
courtroom, the test for allowing a plaintiff to recover in a tort suit of this type is not 
scientific certainty but legal sufficiency; if reasonable jurors could conclude from the 
expert testimony that paraquat more likely than not caused Ferebee’s injury, the fact 
that . . . science would require more evidence before conclusively considering the 
causation question resolved is irrelevant.   
736 F.2d at 1535-36. 
98
 See, e.g., Hollander v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 289 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2002) (affirming 
the district court’s exclusion of the plaintiff’s causation expert, who testified to a causal 
connection between plaintiff’s use of the drug Parlodel—prescribed as, among other things, a 
lactation suppressant to postpartum women—and her intracerebral hemorrhage less than a 
week after she began using the drug).  The Tenth Circuit stated that 
[the plaintiff’s] evidence provided support for the FDA’s decision to withdraw the 
indication for Parlodel as a postpartum lactation suppressant, as well as for the 
decisions of experienced clinicians that the apparent risks of Parlodel outweighed the 
limited benefits of prescribing the drug as a lactation suppressant.  However, the 
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To the extent that Joiner ratified the reliability of the theoretical scientist’s 
methodology and cast substantial, if not complete, doubt as to the reliability of the 
practical scientist’s methodology, Joiner reinforced Daubert’s explicit linkage 
between “evidentiary reliability” and “scientific validity.”   
C.  Linking Evidentiary Reliability to Scientific Validity: A Static Bar Approach to 
Admissibility 
Professor Berger has argued that the “unstated message” of Daubert and Joiner is 
that “evidence that is inconclusive from a scientific perspective automatically fails to 
satisfy” Rule 702’s reliability threshold and thus must be excluded. 99  In other 
words, the quality of the evidence that is required for a “reliable courtroom 
conclusion”—that is, an expert proffer that meets the Rule 702’s “reliability 
threshold”—is the same as that which theoretical scientists would require before 
reaching a “scientifically valid” conclusion for non-litigation purposes.  This 
effectively means that, under Daubert and Joiner’s evidentiary philosophy, “science 
and the law are answering the same question when asked to determine causation.”100   
One consequence of linking evidentiary reliability with scientific validity is that 
“a uniform standard of ‘reliability’ . . . will apply equally no matter what the issue 
being litigated . . . .”101  Returning to the Vosburg v. Putney example, if a scientist is 
asked whether a schoolmate’s kick caused damage to a young man’s shin bone, he or 
she does not need to know whether the blow was malicious as opposed to an 
unintentional act.  Yet, as a matter of substantive tort law, traditionally the causation 
requirement has been “loosened” in cases where the defendant’s conduct was 
particularly reprehensible.102  To the extent that the “reliability screen . . . presumes 
that the [causation] question is one of scientific ‘fact’ rather than a policy choice in 
the context of scientific uncertainty” is “insensitive” to policy concerns that 
classically underlie substantive tort law.103  This might be called a “static bar 
approach” to admissibility. 
                                                          
district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the . . . evidence did not satisfy 
the Daubert standard of reliability. 
Id. at 1217; see also Rider v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1201 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(“[The] risk-utility analysis involves a much lower standard than that which is demanded by a 
court of law.  A regulatory agency such as the FDA may choose to err on the side of caution.  
Courts, however, are required by the Daubert trilogy to engage in an objective review of 
evidence to determine whether it has sufficient . . . basis to be considered reliable.”). 
99
 Berger, Upsetting the Balance, supra note 10, at 297, 299. 
100
 Id. at 299. 
101
 Gottesman, Triple Play, supra note 88, at 762. 
102
 See, e.g., Malone, supra note 22, at 72-73.   
103
 Gottesman, Triple Play, supra note 88, at 762; see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Is 
Science a Special Case? The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence After Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1779, 1794-95 (1995) (criticizing Daubert’s underlying assumption 
“that law and science are aimed at the same thing—finding the truth.  This assumption makes 
law sound rather lofty, but it oversimplifies the role of courts and distorts the purpose of the 
rules they apply.  A more accurate view is that adjudication is intended to restore social 
harmony among parties in dispute; what adjudication seeks is repose . . . .  For some cases that 
very well may mean creating a compensatory mechanism even in the absence of clear 
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss3/7
2009] A “MOVING BAR” APPROACH 595 
Daubert’s and Joiner’s mode of analysis—linking admissibility to scientific 
validity—defaults to the status quo ante.  That is, in cases of scientific uncertainty, 
the presumption is that law—at least tort law—should not intervene. 104  As Judge 
Posner once put it, “law lags science.”105   
Scholars have debated whether a “lagging tort system” is preferable to a more 
reactive system.  Specifically, a court in the latter system will allow the jury to 
decide a case despite strong scientific uncertainty as to whether there is a causal 
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury.  On the one 
hand, a tort system that restrains from imposing liability in the face of scientific 
uncertainty tends to reduce the problem of inefficient over-deterrence: There can be 
little doubt that the potential for tort liability negatively affects the incentives to 
engage in conduct such as the creation and marketing of new drugs, vaccines, or 
other products—conduct that is often socially beneficial on net, even when 
accompanied by risk of harm.106  To the extent the tort system becomes overzealous 
in its regulation, through imposition of liability, of socially beneficial activities that 
possibly—but not certainly—create harmful side effects, it begins to exhibit the same 
flaws as the so-called Precautionary Principle.107  Professor Sunstein has argued, “[a] 
                                                          
scientific proof of cause and effect.”); Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the 
Courthouse: How Trial Judges are Using Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort 
Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 365 (1999) (“Epidemiologists do not have to make 
decisions about who should financially bear a risk, or about how responsibility for ascertaining 
and reducing a risk should be allocated.”). 
104
 Anthony Z. Roisman, Conflict Resolution in the Courts: The Role of Science, 15 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1945, 1950-51 (1994) (“[Daubert’s presumption is] that it is better not to 
have a legal resolution of a dispute than to have the dispute resolved incorrectly. . . . [and] that 
individual members of society are more appropriate to bear the risks of commerce than is 
society as a whole or those who profit from the activities that create the risk.”). 
105
 Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Law lags science; it 
does not lead it.”); see also Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 728 (Tex. 
1997) (“[T]he law should not be hasty to impose liability when scientifically reliable evidence 
is unavailable.”). 
106
 See Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management 
in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 311 (1985) (arguing that tort liability “is most certain to 
have regressive risk consequences when it delays the introduction of new technology that has 
already received administrative approval.”).  Huber’s polemic is the whooping cough vaccine.  
The vaccine resulted in a net savings of 413 lives per year.  However, approximately 25 
children per year suffered an adverse reaction to the vaccine that resulted in serious, long-term 
brain damage.  The vaccine thus “increases the risk of one particular form of injury a little, but 
drastically reduces the risk of another.”  Id. at 288.  Nevertheless, due to “too much regulation 
in the courts,” one of the leading producers of the vaccine bailed out of the market in 1984.  
Id.; see also Susan R. Poulter, Science and Toxic Torts: Is There a Rational Solution to the 
Problem of Causation?, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 189, 192-93 (1992) (“Erroneous plaintiffs’ verdicts 
and the corresponding overcompensation and over-deterrence are not just academic concerns.  
The prospect of useful products being driven from the market or of economic resources being 
diverted from productive uses is real, as the cases of vaccines and Bendectin illustrate.”). 
107
 “The precautionary principle simply reflects the classic adage: Better safe than sorry.  
The principle suggests that government should take precautions to protect public health and 
the environment, even in the absence of clear evidence of harm and notwithstanding the costs 
of such action.”  Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. 
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rational system of risk regulation certainly takes precautions.  But, it does not adopt 
the Precautionary Principle.”108  Thus, there are valid arguments that a tort plaintiff 
should be required to come forward with causation evidence that meets the standard 
of “scientific validity.”  If such evidence does not exist, the defendant should not be 
exposed to tort liability.  Otherwise, the defendant might be deterred from engaging 
in conduct that, on net, is socially beneficial. 
Yet, a lagging tort system necessarily risks under-deterrence of “inefficient risk-
taking.”109  At any given time, entire classes of plaintiffs will be foreclosed from 
receiving compensation because the science demonstrating a causal connection 
between their injuries and would-be defendants’ actions is in its infancy stage, or 
simply not yet well enough developed to cross a reliability threshold that is based on 
scientific validity.  Because there are legal impediments, such as statutes of 
limitations, that preclude would-be plaintiffs from waiting to bring their cases until 
the science has become more developed, a lagging tort system will necessarily fail to 
ensure that all actors will be forced to internalize the harms that their actions 
cause.110  Moreover, in many circumstances the ethical and practical limitations of 
scientific testing will make it impossible for plaintiffs ever to come forward with 
causation evidence meeting a reliability threshold based on scientific validity.111  In 
such cases, a putative defendant will escape any liability exposure even if it is agreed 
that there is a non-zero chance that its conduct has caused and continues to cause 
harm—the very definition of under-deterrence. 
In modern society, scientific evidence often suggests a possible causal connection 
between a particular activity (ground water pollution, for example) and a particular 
harm (cancer); however, the evidence is not demonstrative of a statistically or 
scientifically certain causal connection.  Thus, under an admissibility regime that 
demands such statistical or scientific certainty, some amount of under-deterrence is 
unavoidable.  Yet, a return to a “let it all in” regime is both unwise—it might solve 
the under-deterrence problem but would create in its place an over-deterrence 
problem—and impractical given the burdens already being placed on the judicial 
system.  Still, solving the under-deterrence problem is critical because, in many 
                                                          
& LEE L. REV. 851, 851 (1996).  The logical flaw of the Precautionary Principle is that 
“regulation will often cause more . . . harm than good.”  Id. at 860.  
108
 Cass R. Sunstein, The Paralyzing Principle, REGULATION, Winter 2002-2003, at 37. 
109
 David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” 
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 862 (1984). 
110
 Although there has been very little, if any, study of Daubert from the perspective of 
law and economics, intuitively the Daubert standard must result in a failure to optimally deter 
possibly harmful conduct.  Cf. Steve Gold, Note, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, 
Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376, 397 (1984) (“Any 
system of all-or-nothing awards is economically inefficient in toxic torts cases.”).  After all, 
the Daubert standard is “all-or-nothing”—at least when administered in a tort regime that 
utilizes an “all-or-nothing” preponderance of the evidence approach to compensation—in the 
sense that a plaintiff’s expert causation evidence will be excluded (effectively sinking the 
plaintiff’s case) even where the state of the science gives one reason to at least suspect a 
causal connection between A and B.  
111
 Clifford Fisher, The Role of Causation in Science as Law and Proposed Changes in the 
Current Common Law Toxic Tort System, 9 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 35, 63 (2001). 
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contexts, “false negatives are costlier than false positives.”112  A new, creative 
solution might be in order. 
One possible solution is to use a method of “‘public law’ adjudication as a 
substitute for the system’s traditional individualized process in order to resolve 
causal connection questions . . . .”113  “[T]he central component of this . . . approach 
is the replacement of the preponderance rule by a standard of proportional liability,” 
and “courts would impose liability and distribute compensation in proportion to the 
probability of causation assigned to the excess disease risk in the exposed 
population, regardless whether that probability fell above or below the fifty-percent 
threshold and despite the absence of individualized proof of the causal 
connection.”114  Under this system, a plaintiff would not be required to introduce 
scientific evidence demonstrating a causal connection between his or her injuries and 
the defendant’s conduct.  Rather, the plaintiff would only need to introduce evidence 
demonstrating that the defendant’s conduct increased the risk of the plaintiff’s 
injury.115  The plaintiff’s recovery would be limited to the extent of the increase.  For 
example, if a plaintiff’s expert could reliably testify to a thirty percent likelihood that 
the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the defendant’s conduct, then the defendant 
would be liable for up to thirty percent of the plaintiff’s injuries.116 
A second potential solution is even more radical: A defendant’s liability is 
determined by a finding of inadequate testing.  This solution—which might be called 
“inadequate testing liability”—is based not so much on optimal deterrence as on 
“tort law’s corrective justice rationale that liability is linked to moral 
responsibility.”117  Professor Berger, one of the leading proponents of this solution, 
argues “that if a defendant is negligent in discovering and disseminating substantial 
adverse information about its product . . . it should be liable for adverse health 
effects in those exposed, and plaintiffs should be relieved of proving general 
causation.”118  This argument is premised on the view that “[a] corporation should 
                                                                
112
 Id. at 47. 
113
 Rosenberg, supra note 109, at 859.  
114
 Id. 
115
 Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1220-21 (1987) (“[I]f there 
was a thirty percent likelihood that the defendant caused the plaintiff’s cancer, the plaintiff 
would receive thirty percent of his total damages.”). 
116
 Although the proportional liability proposal was not intended as a solution to the 
problem of expert evidence admissibility, some evidence scholars have suggested a version of 
proportional liability to deal with the problem of scientific uncertainty.  See Feldman, supra 
note 48, at 45 (“Another option would be to split damages in half . . . in any case in which the 
plaintiff could establish strong uncertainty about causation, and the defendant could not 
eliminate it.  [Such a change] would increase the incentive for the makers of potentially toxic 
substances to investigate the substances’ causal powers more carefully before distributing 
them widely.”).  
117
  Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of 
Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2119 (1997) [hereinafter Berger, 
Eliminating General Causation]. 
118
 Id. at 2147.  There have been a few different iterations of the inadequate testing 
proposal.  For example, one commentator has argued that, if the plaintiff can show that the 
defendant inadequately tested its product, there should be a rebuttable presumption that the 
19Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009
598 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:579 
have no incentive to gamble that its product is probably safe or that proving 
causation will likely take twenty years.”119 
Both the proportional liability and inadequate testing liability proposals have 
serious limitations and provide, at best, an imperfect answer to the under-deterrence 
problem inherent in a Rule 702 regime that equates evidentiary admissibility with 
scientific validity.  With respect to the proportional liability approach, its 
applicability to circumstances outside the mass exposure context is doubtful.120  As 
Peter Huber points out, “[o]nly mass-exposure defendants can practicably be called 
to account for the risk—as distinguished from the harm—they create, and only in the 
mass-exposure context do the proportional liability rules and streamlined ‘public 
law’ procedures make any sense.”121  Huber might be overshooting a bit, but his 
point that “only mass producers can be required to pay accelerated compensation for 
risk created”122 is well taken.   
More broadly, the proportional liability rule depends “upon the existence of 
reliable, meaningful information” about the probability that there is a causal 
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury.123  It is 
therefore unclear whether the proportional liability rule would provide much 
assistance to plaintiffs in circumstances of “[s]trong uncertainty about general 
causation.”124  In such circumstances, proportional liability would, at best, result in 
compensatory outcomes that approximate best guesses at the likelihood of causal 
connections.125  Under a proportional liability regime, therefore, the Daubert inquiry 
would simply shift to an examination of whether a plaintiff’s (or a defendant’s) 
expert’s opinion regarding the statistical causal connection between A and B clears 
the reliability threshold.126  Thus, although proportional liability is an elegant 
                                                          
product caused the plaintiff’s harm.  See Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the 
Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 834 (1997).   
119
 Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 117, at 2147. 
120
 Indeed, it is not obvious that Professor Rosenberg would argue for application of 
proportional liability outside of the mass exposure context.  See Rosenberg, supra note 109, at 
858 (“The preponderance rule may be adequate for the set of sporadic accident cases in which 
causal indeterminancy arises randomly and always signifies a substantial chance that the 
defendant in fact harmed no one.”). 
121
 Huber, supra note 106, at 315. 
122
 Id. 
123
 Feldman, supra note 48, at 39. 
124
 Id. at 40.  
125
 See David A. Fischer, Proportional Liability: Statistical Evidence and the Probability 
Paradox, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1201, 1221 n.51 (1993). 
126
 See Gold, supra note 110, at 397-98 (“Rosenberg imagines a mystically precise 
probability that would determine the proportional recovery.  His proposal would have 
plaintiffs pick their preferred probability, plead it, and prove it, while defendants could assert 
lower probabilities.  The trouble is that it may be impossible rationally to choose any such 
value.  Even a convincingly proven value would still be only an estimate; hence no scientific 
justification exists for setting the proportion equal to the reported value rather than at some 
other point in the reasonable range.  Yet, under such a system, plaintiffs and defendants would 
likely end up bidding for duplicative and wasteful studies, jockeying for possession of the 
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solution to the problems caused by the “all-or-nothing, more probable than not” 
regime, it does not appear to be an adequate solution to the potential under-
deterrence problems inherent in a Rule 702 regime that links reliability to scientific 
validity.127 
Perhaps the most intractable problem with the proportional liability rule, 
however, is a practical one: it is unlikely to be adopted by courts or legislatures.  
Even the leading proponents of proportional liability would likely concede that an 
abandonment of the all-or-nothing, more probable than not rule is unlikely to derive 
from the judiciary, if for no other reason than inertia.128  And legislatures seem 
unlikely to abandon the preponderance rule, if only because such a change would be 
politically unpopular with a culture that largely disdains the plaintiff’s bar.   
The inadequate testing liability proposal is likewise far from an ideal solution 
either.  As an initial matter, it is even more radical than the proportional liability 
proposal because it disregards causation as an element entirely.129  Like proportional 
liability, it seems unlikely that either courts or legislatures would enact such a 
reform, which quite literally would create a new category of tort: failure to test 
adequately.130  Beyond this, however, imposing liability for inadequate testing might 
not do much to simplify matters for the jury or the court.  There would remain the 
problem of determining whether the defendant in fact failed to test its product 
adequately.  In some cases this determination might be easy—for example, when 
there is evidence that the defendant was willfully blind to known risks,131  
                                                          
study with the highest (or lowest) reported probability estimate.”); Farber, supra note 115, at 
1227 (“[C]ausation of diseases like cancer is so poorly understood . . . .  Many toxic 
substances are relatively novel, and, given the long latency periods associated with cancer, 
sufficient evidence concerning health effects is not likely to be available for the foreseeable 
future . . . . Epidemiological studies are . . . helpful but often inconclusive regarding the level 
of risk created by a toxic substance.”); Charles Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue Bus: 
Factfinding at the Frontier of Knowledge, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 521, 534 (1986) (noting that there 
is “little likelihood of firm conclusions” on scientific causation questions). 
127
 Professor Feldman has referred to this as a “timing problem”: “[M]ass exposure . . . 
suits . . . are put in motion and require resolution before there is sufficient scientific data to 
determine reliably the causal powers of the substances in question.”  Feldman, supra note 48, 
at 45-46. 
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 See Fischer, supra note 125, at 1226.  As Professor Fischer notes, “The type of 
proportional liability that does the best overall job of providing compensation and achieving 
corrective justice is proportional risk recovery.”  Id.  Yet, “this version of proportional liability 
represents the most significant departure from traditional tort principles,” and “[t]herefore, 
courts and legislatures are least likely to adopt it.”  Id.  
129
 Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Believing in Products Liability: Reflections on Daubert, Doctrinal 
Evolution, and David Owen’s Products Liability Law, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 511, 524 (2006) 
(“[Inadequate testing liability] is a bold proposal, not an evolutionary baby step.”). 
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 See Margaret Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed Choice: 
Unmasking Daubert, 104 MICH. L. REV. 257, 259 (2005) (arguing that courts should 
“recognize the right of [consumers] to informed choice about risks associated with the use of a 
[product], a right that does not require plaintiffs to prove that the toxic agent was the cause of 
the plaintiff’s harm.”).  
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 See, e.g., Barrow v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 96-689-CIV-ORL-19B, 1998 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 23187, at *204 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 1998) (“MEC, the party in the superior 
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particularly risks that could have easily been discovered with modest further testing.  
But in other cases, it would be a complex question and there is little reason to believe 
that a jury will be able to assess accurately whether the defendant tested sufficiently, 
an inquiry that would require a complex analysis of the costs and benefits of more 
testing and increased deliberation on the part of the defendant. 
In addition, creating liability for inadequate testing would likely “delay the 
availability of innovative, potentially beneficial products.” 132  Thus, the inadequate 
testing proposal would solve one problem—under-deterrence—but potentially result 
in an equally (or even more) serious problem—over-deterrence.   
Finally, the inadequate testing proposal would seemingly operate as a sui generis 
rule applicable only in products liability torts.  It would have no application in other 
contexts in which causation experts make up the heart of a plaintiff’s case. 
However, the proportional liability approach, and perhaps even the inadequate 
testing approach, should not be disregarded as potentially valuable changes to 
American tort law.133 In the next section, the author offers a more modest, yet 
potentially effective, solution to the under-deterrence problem that Daubert might 
cause: Rather than a static bar approach to admissibility, risk assessment principles 
should be integrated into the expert evidence inquiry.  Under this type of approach to 
admissibility questions, the degree of reliability that a court would require of expert 
causation testimony in any given case would be adjusted according to whether 
principles of economic efficiency and social utility pushed in favor of placing either 
more or less of the burden of uncertainty on the plaintiff.134 
The author’s proposal is based on the assumptions that (1) courts are required to 
assess the reliability of proffered expert testimony before allowing its admission;135 
                                                          
position to know of the defects in [its silicone breast implants] and the party with the superior 
economic capability to design and conduct tests to determine the safety of its product before 
offering it for sale, essentially turned a blind eye to the harms that could befall a person 
implanted with its [product].  MEC took an ‘ostrich approach’ to potential harms from its 
product so that it could contend, as it has done in this case, that it ‘did not know’ of such 
harms when complaints were made.”). 
132
 See Feldman, supra note 48, at 46.  Perhaps in an attempt to temper this concern, 
Professors Berger and Twerski have seemed to suggest that dispensing with the traditional 
causation requirement might be restricted to what they call “lifestyle” products.  See Berger & 
Twerski, supra note 130, at 289.  But see id. at 287 n.148 (conceding that there is no clear line 
between “therapeutic” and “lifestyle” drugs). 
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 The proportional liability is particularly attractive as a matter of theory.  See Farber, 
supra note 115, at 1240 (“[T]he general policies of tort law are advanced by allowing 
proportional recovery.”); Steven Shavell, Uncertainty Over Causation and the Determination 
of Civil Liability, 28 J.L. & ECON. 587, 587 (1985) (“[L]iability in proportion to the probability 
of causation is superior to all other criteria and results in socially ideal behavior.”).  However, 
the chance that courts or legislatures will widely adopt a proportional liability rule seems 
sufficiently remote.  More modest alternatives that attempt to serve similar ends must be 
explored. 
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 To the extent that the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating the reliability of its 
expert, the burden of uncertainty is necessarily placed on the plaintiff.  Adjusting the 
reliability bar up or down, however, will determine just how much uncertainty the plaintiff 
will be forced to bear. 
135
 In other words, my proposal assumes the continued existence of a gate-keeping duty. 
22https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss3/7
2009] A “MOVING BAR” APPROACH 601 
and (2) that tort claims will continue to be governed under the traditional “all-or-
nothing, more probable than not” rule with the plaintiff bearing the burden of 
proving causation.  The proposal is based on the idea that the most problematic 
aspect of Daubert’s mode of analysis is not that it sets the reliability bar too high or 
too low, but that it suggests that the bar should be set in the same place in every case. 
III.  A MOVING BAR APPROACH TO ASSESSING THE RELIABILITY OF EXPERT 
CAUSATION TESTIMONY 
The previous section demonstrated that Daubert and Joiner collectively imply 
that a court’s assessment of whether expert causation evidence is sufficiently reliable 
to be admitted ought not be influenced by case-specific tort policy considerations, 
such as deterrence.  This Article refers to this as the “static bar” approach to 
admissibility.  Under such an approach, a court is not permitted to adjust the height 
of the reliability bar—that is, accept a lesser (or demand a greater) degree of 
reliability of a causation expert’s proffer—based upon case-specific policy 
considerations. 
In this section, the author proposes an alternative approach to questions of 
admissibility that would affirmatively incorporate case-specific policy considerations 
into the court’s analysis of whether a causation expert’s proffer is sufficiently 
reliable to warrant admission.  This approach is called a “moving bar” approach to 
admissibility.  The author first argues that policy considerations historically 
influenced courts in deciding whether to allow juries to speculate on uncertain 
causation-in-fact questions and that this was justified on economic grounds.  The 
author then argues that because of the outcome determinative role of admissibility 
decisions in modern litigation, policy considerations should similarly influence 
courts in their analysis of whether a causation expert is sufficiently reliable to 
warrant admission. 
A.  The Traditional Role of Policy in Helping to Resolve Uncertain Questions of 
Causation 
There can be no doubt that tort law and the modern regulatory system have been 
treated as distinct legal vehicles serving distinct ends.  One of the most pellucid 
examples of this is Judge Weinstein’s opinion in the Agent Orange136 case.  Although 
Judge Weinstein recognized that there was sufficient evidence of Agent Orange’s 
toxicity to justify ex ante regulation of the product, there was insufficient evidence to 
warrant ex post compensation via tort law:  
The distinction between avoidance of risk through regulation and 
compensation for injuries after the fact is a fundamental one.  In the 
former, risk assessments may lead to control of a toxic substance even 
though the probability of harm to any individual is small and the studies 
necessary to assess the risk are incomplete; society as a whole is willing to 
pay the price as a matter of policy.  In the latter, a far higher probability 
(greater than 50%) is required since the law believes it unfair to require an 
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 In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).  
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individual to pay for another’s tragedy unless it is shown that it is more 
likely than not that he caused it.137   
Nevertheless, there is substantial literature documenting the tort system’s goal of, 
and role in, deterring harmful conduct ex ante.138  To the extent that “tort law 
generates penalties . . . that give future actors a material incentive either to take 
precautions while acting or to avoid the activity altogether,”139 the tort system’s goals 
and effects largely overlap those of the regulatory system.140   
Consistent with its regulatory-type role in influencing the economic incentives of 
private actors, tort law has been shaped in significant ways by policy 
considerations,141 and courts’ decisions traditionally have been imbued with, and 
animated by, broader policy concerns.  As Professor Malone wrote more than fifty 
years ago, courts’ decisions regarding causation-in-fact could largely be explained by 
“the mysterious relationship between policy and fact.”142  Professor Prosser similarly 
treated causation as a “thin shell[] into which a variety of policy judgments could be 
poured.”143  Contemporary law and economics scholars take the normative view that 
the function of all tort rules is to “bring about . . . the efficient . . . level of accidents 
and safety,”144 which undoubtedly rings of policy.   
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 Id. at 781.  
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  See, e.g., John C. P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 544-
45 (2003) (describing views of “compensation-deterrence theorists”).  
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 Id. at 544. 
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 See Peter L. Kahn, Regulation and Simple Arithmetic: Shifting the Perspective on Tort 
Reform, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1129, 1135 (1994) (“If there were no formal administrative 
regulation of health and safety, the tort system would nevertheless provide some control over 
health and safety decisions by private parties such as product manufacturers or service 
providers.”); Rosenberg, supra note 109, at 926 (arguing that class actions in particular 
provide a “comprehensive, regulatory perspective”); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of 
Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 31 (1972) (“[T]he creation of private rights of action can 
also be a means of regulation.”). 
141
 See, e.g., Welco Indus., Inc. v. Applied Cos., 617 N.E.2d 1129, 1133 (Ohio 1993) 
(stating that tort law “is guided largely by public policy considerations”); MORTON J. 
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 99 (1977).  For example, 
according to Professor Horwitz’s “subsidy thesis,” the shift from strict liability to negligence 
in American law in the nineteenth century was driven by the desire to promote economic 
growth.  Professor Horwitz’s subsidy thesis has been attacked on empirical grounds.  See, e.g., 
Gary T. Schwartz, The Character of Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L. REV. 641 (1989). 
142
 Malone, supra note 22, at 60-61 (“At the close of the [nineteenth century,] courts used 
the term ‘cause’ indiscriminately to express either their conclusion as to ‘what happened’ or as 
a means of explaining what law ‘ought to do about it.’”).  Professor Malone phrased the 
problem in terms of a range of possibilities that the defendant’s conduct was a cause-in-fact of 
the injury that might satisfy a court enough to send a case to the jury.  “The point at which [a 
court] might be satisfied can be expressed in many ways, such as ‘barely possible,’ ‘possible,’ 
‘not unlikely,’ ‘as possible as not,’ ‘probable,’ ‘highly probable,’ or ‘virtually certain.’”  Id. at 
67. 
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 Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Malpractice and the Structure of Negligence Law, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 649, 689 (1998). 
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 Posner, supra note 140, at 33.   
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That policy considerations drive “substantive tort law”—that is, liability rules— 
does not rest easily with the fact that, as has been argued above, the Daubert/Joiner 
mode of analysis of assessing the “reliability” of an expert proffer is bereft of policy 
considerations.  To be sure, Daubert’s recognition of a trial judge’s gatekeeping role 
was driven by various policy concerns.145  But, to the extent that “reliability” is to be 
determined according to “scientific validity,” a court’s reliability assessment should 
not be affected by policy considerations unique to the case at hand.  As Professor 
Gottesman puts it, Daubert treats reliability as a “question . . . of scientific ‘fact’ 
rather than a policy choice in the context of scientific uncertainty” resulting in 
“policy choices [being] ignored under the guise of administering a rule of 
evidence.”146   
Because admissibility decisions essentially operate as “summary judgment 
substitutes,”147 it should be cause for concern that the Daubert/Joiner mode of 
analysis results in trial outcomes that might impede the achievement of substantive 
tort policies—namely the goal of optimal deterrence.  Setting aside whether this 
raises concerns under the Rules Enabling Act148—a topic that is far beyond the scope 
of this Article—it arguably demonstrates that Daubert took a wrong turn somewhere 
along the line. 
The mistake lies in the premise that the tort system is foremost concerned with 
pure “truth-seeking.”149  Although it might sound absurd to criticize such a 
premise—if for no other reason than Federal Rule of Evidence 102 provides that 
“[t]hese rules shall be construed to secure . . . promotion of growth and development 
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 See, e.g., Bobby Marzine Harges, An Analysis of Expert Testimony in Louisiana State 
Courts After State v. Foret and Independent Fire Insurance Company v. Sunbeam Corporation, 
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 Gottesman, Triple Play, supra note 88, at 762. 
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 Lind, supra note 19, at 772-74 (“Where liability . . . turns on the opinions of conflicting 
experts, summary judgment would normally be precluded as a defense option . . . .  However, 
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can use to oppose summary judgment. . . . [M]any commentators conclude the outcome of a 
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of admissibility holdings.”  Ronald J. Allen, Expertise and the Supreme Court: What is the 
Problem?, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 12 (2003); see also Dale A. Nance, Reliability and the 
Admissibility of Experts, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 191, 216 (2003) (suggesting the same but 
pointing out that admissibility rulings are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, 
while pure sufficiency rulings are reviewed de novo).  
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 See generally Michael H. Gottesman, Should Federal Evidence Rules Trump State Tort 
Policy? The Federalism Values Daubert Ignored, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1837 (1994) 
[hereinafter Gottesman, Federalism Values]. 
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 Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s Formative Encounters 
with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1131 (1998) (“Daubert’s 
approach places so high a value on truth-seeking that it is willing to risk the episodic (and 
perhaps cumulative) loss of public confidence.”). 
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of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained”150—there are 
myriad examples of “procedural” rules (including the Rules of Evidence) that cannot 
be justified by such an “ascertainment of truth” principle,151 and still other times 
evidence is excluded even though it advances the quest for “truth.”152  The most that 
can be said is that “discovery of truth is only one of the aims of adjudication under 
the Federal Rules [of Evidence].”153 
Professor Nesson argues that “[t]he aim of the factfinding process is not to 
generate mathematically ‘probable’ verdicts, but rather to generate acceptable 
ones.”154  Further, he argues that “[a]cceptable verdicts and probable verdicts might 
appear to coincide, given that one obvious way to gain public acceptance is to search 
for truth.  But the correlation between probability and acceptability is not exact: a 
probable verdict may not be acceptable, and an acceptable verdict may not be 
probable.”155  Professor Nesson’s insights coincide with scholars’ descriptive and 
normative arguments regarding the critical role that policy considerations play in 
how courts deal with questions of causation-in-fact.156  Law and economics scholars 
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 See Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-in-Fact Rules for 
Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CAL. L. REV. 881, 891 (1982) (“Malone, Green, Keeton, and 
Prosser purport to find a sliding-scale approach, in which courts apply the causation-in-fact 
requirement with decreasing stringency as the equities or public policies increasingly favor 
recovery.”); id. (“On its face a simple, mechanical formula requiring only a finding of physical 
fact, the requirement of but-for causation is in reality a contextual, policy-sensitive 
instrument.”); Malone, supra note 22, at 61, 72 (“[P]olicy may often be a factor when the issue 
of cause-in-fact is presented sharply for decision . . . . We can now ask: How great must be the 
affinity of causal likelihood between the defendant’s wrong and the plaintiff’s injury in order 
to justify the judge in submitting the cause issue to the jury?  The answer is that the affinity 
must be sufficiently close in the opinion of the judge to bring into effective play the rule of 
law that would make the defendant’s conduct wrongful.”); Michael S. Moore, Thomson’s 
Preliminaries About Causation and Rights, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 497, 501 n.25 (1987) (“The 
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in particular have treated the question of causation-in-fact as presenting not a 
question of factual probability but instead a question of acceptability, with economic 
efficiency being the measure of acceptability: “In [the law and economics] tradition, 
if efficiency requires holding the defendant liable, he is said to have caused the 
accident, but not otherwise . . . .  Landes and Posner are more explicit than others 
about this policy judgment . . . .  Saying the defendant caused the accident means, in 
their view, that efficiency requires holding him liable.”157 
To the extent that the decision whether to admit a plaintiff’s causation expert 
merges with the decision whether to allow the plaintiff to withstand summary 
judgment, it is easy to see how the admissibility inquiry carries with it enormous 
policy implications.  In cases illustrating that where the plaintiff’s ability to 
withstand summary judgment depends upon the admissibility of her causation expert, 
the “degree of ‘reliability’ that is imposed as a precondition to allowing the . . . 
experts to testify . . . is going to influence where, along the spectrum, the competing 
societal interests will be balanced.”158  As Professor Gottesman points out,  
[a] government that deems the encouragement of new products more 
important than the risk of leaving victims uncompensated might insist 
upon a high degree of scientific certainty (or at least probability) before 
allowing a case to proceed.  On the other hand, a government that 
balances the policies differently and values compensation and deterrence 
over the societal benefits of risky substances might allow plaintiffs to 
recover on a showing that is less conclusive.159 
Although Professor Gottesman is correct in finding that Daubert’s mode of 
analysis is flawed because it “presumes that the [causation] question is one of 
scientific ‘fact’ rather than a policy choice in the context of scientific uncertainty,”160 
Professor Gottesman fails to develop adequately how the expert admissibility 
analysis ought to be amended in order to deal with this.   
                                                          
influence of Malone, Edgerton, and Green is quite evident in the law and economics literature 
on causation.  Thus, Guido Calabresi concludes to his satisfaction that ‘in the law cause in 
fact’ . . . is in the end a functional concept designed to achieve human goals.” (quoting Guido 
Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 69, 107 (1975))); Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of 
Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463, 502 (1980) (arguing that causation should 
be defined in order to serve “well-specified social goals” and that “[q]uestions about causation 
are to an important extent resolved by resort to intuitions about the justness of applying a rule 
of liability.”). 
157
 Cooter, supra note 20, at 540. 
158
 Gottesman, Triple Play, supra note 88, at 761.  Theoretically there might be cases in 
which the admissibility of a defendant’s causation expert might determine whether the 
defendant can withstand summary judgment.  But these circumstances are likely exceedingly 
rare, and possibly non-existent. 
159
 Id. at 761-62.  It is important to emphasize the distinction between “allowing” a 
plaintiff to recover and “mandating” that a plaintiff recover.  To say that a rule “allows” a 
plaintiff to recover is only to say that the rule allows the plaintiff to withstand summary 
judgment. 
160
 Id.  Professor Gottesman points out that “in both Daubert and Joiner, the available data 
. . . [were] suggestive of causation.”  Id. at 769. 
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B.  Beyond a Static Bar Approach to Assessing Reliability 
A modest—yet potentially important—change to the admissibility mode of 
analysis would be to move away from what the author earlier called a “static bar 
approach” and toward an approach that varies the height of the “reliability bar” on a 
case-by-case basis in response to substantive tort policy considerations.161  This 
might be called a “moving bar approach.”  Unlike a static bar approach—which can 
impede the attainment of substantive tort goals, and in particular optimal 
deterrence—a moving bar approach would better enable Rule 702 to be instrumental 
to the attainment of those goals. 
The premise of the moving bar approach is that, in cases involving causal 
uncertainty, decisions regarding the admissibility of expert causation testimony are 
functionally equivalent to determining whether to send a so-called “loss of chance” 
case to the jury.162  Accordingly, the mode of analysis for an admissibility decision 
should roughly mirror the mode of analysis courts traditionally have employed in 
deciding whether a plaintiff can withstand summary judgment in a loss of chance 
case.  “[I]n the general run of things tort law has quietly dealt with under 
determination and loss of a chance through the rough and ready application of 
policy-driven distinctions.”163  Under a moving bar approach to admissibility, the 
mode of analysis for admissibility decisions (at least when such decisions involve 
causation experts) would likewise deal with uncertainty through a “rough and ready” 
application of policy considerations.  The proposal for a moving bar approach largely 
sidesteps the question whether—as one symposium has put it—the reliability bar is 
                                                                
161
 Professor Paul Milich has previously argued for a moving bar approach, but he would 
move the bar on entirely different grounds.  In Milich’s view:  
[I]n deciding how much evidence of reliability a trial judge should require before 
admitting novel or controversial scientific evidence, the standard . . . should adjust to 
the nature and complexity of the scientific dispute in question . . . . [I]f the scientific 
disputes in a particular case are not too technical . . . the trial judge can be comfortable 
admitting such evidence upon a modest showing of scientific support and letting the 
jury hear and resolve the disputes.  But if the scientific disputes concern highly 
technical or complicated issues that a jury will not comprehend, let alone master, the 
trial judge should require a strong showing of established scientific support before 
admitting the evidence.  
Paul S. Milich, Controversial Science in the Courtroom: Daubert and the Law’s Hubris, 43 
EMORY L.J. 913, 925-26 (1994). 
162
 See Lind, supra note 19, at 772.  “Loss of chance” is sometimes referred to as an 
“indeterminate plaintiff problem.”  See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prods. Liab. Litig., 611 F. 
Supp. at 1408 (“Given the lack of scientific basis for general causation and the significant 
uncertainties involved in proof of individual causation—that is, the indeterminate plaintiff 
problem—it cannot now be established with any appropriate degree of probability that any 
individuals who suffer from the diseases listed in the PMC’s plan incurred them as a result of 
Agent Orange exposure, or that these diseases are more likely than others to be causally 
related.”).  Loss of chance cases often occur in the context of toxic torts, but this is not always 
the case.  See generally, e.g., Malone, supra note 22 (discussing various paradigmatic loss of 
chance cases). 
163
 Aaron Twerski & Anthony J. Sebok, Liability Without Cause? Further Ruminations on 
Cause-in-Fact as Applied to Handgun Liability, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1379, 1383 (2000).   
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“too high, too low, or just right.”164  The moving bar approach suggests that the 
answers are “it depends” and “maybe all of the above.” 
Under a moving bar approach, a trial court could use policy considerations as a  
“thumb on the scale” approach with the reliability bar being either lowered or raised 
only very slightly in response to the particular facts of the case.  Or the moving bar 
approach could operate more like a full-on sliding scale, similar to how criminal 
courts’ treat the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” standard.165  Finally, the 
nature of the defendant’s possibly injurious conduct might simply be treated as an 
additional factor of indeterminate weight in the Daubert analysis.166 
Under either version of the moving bar approach, the trial judge would adjust the 
height of the reliability bar up or down depending on the circumstances of the 
defendant’s possibly injurious conduct.  On the one hand, if the defendant’s conduct 
were particularly reprehensible, or possibly injurious conduct such that potential 
over-deterrence did not present a concern from the perspective of economic 
efficiency,167 then the trial judge would lower the height of the reliability bar.  On the 
other hand, if the defendant’s conduct was not particularly reprehensible, or if 
economic efficiency counseled a greater concern with over-deterrence, the converse 
would be true.  The important point is this: It would be permissible for a court to take 
into consideration the specific nature of the defendant’s allegedly tortious conduct 
when deciding whether the testimony of the plaintiff’s causation expert is 
sufficiently reliable to qualify for admission into evidence.  This would harmonize 
the admissibility inquiry with what Professor Malone described as the way in which 
                                                                
164
 This was the question posed by the 2003 Seton Hall Law Review Symposium. 
165
 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (“[P]robable cause is a fluid concept—
turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even 
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”); see also Ronald J. Bacigal, Putting the People 
Back into the Fourth Amendment, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 395 (1994) (describing the 
“reasonableness” test under the Fourth Amendment as a “sliding scale” under which 
“reasonableness varie[s] according to the ‘facts and circumstances of each case.’”); Ronald J. 
Bacigal, The Fourth Amendment in Flux: The Rise and Fall of Probable Cause, 1979 U. ILL. 
L.F. 763, 765 (1979) (“[T]he required degree of probable cause [is] a ‘sliding scale’ that 
fluctuates with the peculiar facts of each case.”). 
166
 The difficulty of integrating a subjective concept into an already amorphous test has 
been recognized in other contexts.  For example, one commentator has argued that systematic 
investment asymmetries and their potential effect on optimal deterrence should be a factor in 
the class-certification calculus under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)’s superiority 
requirement, but concedes that the “approach is somewhat inexact.”  Randy J. Kozel, Locating 
Investment Asymmetries and Optimal Deterrence in the Mass Tort Class Action, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 2665, 2681 (2004) (“Criticizing judicial consideration of litigation investment 
asymmetries simply for being inexact . . . is inconsistent with the oftentimes imprecise nature 
of modern class action practice.”).  
167
 Scholars have recognized that, if administrative costs are held constant, over-deterrence 
does not present a concern from an economic efficiency standpoint if the conduct at issue 
creates no efficiencies in the first place.  See, e.g., Thomas A. Lambert, Tweaking Antitrust’s 
Business Model, 85 TEX. L. REV. 153, 191 (2006) (noting that “over-deterrence is not a 
concern in . . . cases” involving “practices that create no efficiencies, such as naked price-
fixing”). 
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courts traditionally had decided whether to allow the jury to speculate regarding 
causation-in-fact.168 
IV.  THE MOVING BAR APPROACH IN ACTION 
In this part, the author offers a few paradigmatic cases in which a moving bar 
approach would mark a significant departure from a static bar approach: (1) cases 
involving intentional torts; (2) cases involving the violation of a criminal or 
regulatory statute that results in unintended injury to an unintended victim; and (3) 
cases involving possibly harmful products that provide objectively minimal benefits.   
A.  Intentional Torts 
Under the Second Restatement of Torts, a tort is “intentional” when the actor 
“desires to cause consequences of his act, or . . . believes that the consequences are 
substantially certain to result from it.”169  This definition has been criticized as 
somewhat misleading,170 and Professor Prosser has stated that intention under tort 
law “is not necessarily a hostile intent, or a desire to do any harm.  Rather it is an 
intent to bring about a result that will invade the interests of another in a way that the 
law forbids.”171  Regardless, it is generally agreed that intentional torts are 
particularly reprehensible in that they violate rights that society has deemed 
“inalienable.”172  It is perhaps for this reason that law and economics scholars have 
argued that the optimal occurrence level of intentional torts is zero.173  Likewise, “the 
                                                                
168
 Implicit, then, in the moving bar approach is the idea that “reliability” under Rule 702 
is a relative concept, a view that finds support in the Committee Notes to Rule 702.  See FED. 
R. EVID. 702, Committee Notes (2000) (describing the “factors relevant in determining 
whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable to be considered by the trier of fact” 
(emphasis added)).  This is not necessarily a new idea.  See Nance, supra note 147, at 194 
(“Reliability is inherently relative to a particular decision context, and thus relative to the goal 
or purpose of decision.”); Imwinkelried, supra note 28, at 269 (“The question is not whether 
the concept of reliability is a relative one.  Rather, the issue is in which respects the concept is 
relative.”).  However, neither Professor Nance nor Professor Imwinkelried have previously 
suggested that the height of the reliability bar should move in response to the nature of the 
defendant’s tortious conduct.   
169
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965). 
170
 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 9 (7th ed. 2000) (noting 
that §16 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, which addresses battery, approves of the 
result in Vosburg, notwithstanding that the defendant in that case did not intend to cause 
serious harm to the plaintiff and could not have been substantially certain that such serious 
consequences would follow).  
171
 PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 36 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 
1984); see also Cleveland Park Club v. Perry, 165 A.2d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (“[T]he intent 
controlling is the intent to complete the physical act [that is in and of itself unlawful] and not 
the intent to produce injurious consequences . . . .”). 
172
 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1124–27 (1972). 
173
 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 
153-56 (1987).  Professor Coffee has argued that the law should never “price” intentional torts, 
but should always “prohibit” them.  John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: 
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danger of [damages awards] deterring socially valuable conduct . . . [is] minimized 
and other policies come to the fore, such as making sure that the damages award is 
an effective deterrent by resolving all doubts as to the plaintiff’s actual damages in 
his favor . . . .”174  Thus, as Professor Malone recognized, traditionally “courts 
‘seldom hesitate[d] to allow the jury a free range of speculation’ on the question of 
cause-in-fact in [cases involving] intentional torts.”175  Accordingly, under a moving 
bar approach to admissibility, the trial court’s ability to adjust the reliability bar 
downward in order to ensure that uncertainties toward causation are resolved in the 
plaintiff’s favor should be at its maximum in cases involving what Judge Posner calls 
“real” intentional torts.176 
Civil securities fraud claims regularly present difficult questions with respect to 
the causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiffs’ damages, 
and expert testimony is virtually always required for the plaintiffs to obtain a 
damages award.177  A good example of the causation problems that such cases can 
                                                          
Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 
193, 239 (1991).   
174
 Daniel P. Ryan, Proposed Punitive Damages in Michigan: A Microeconomic Analysis 
of House Bill 5373, 1998 DET. C.L. REV. 197, 207 (1998); see also William M. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of International Torts, 1 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 127, 
136 (1981) (arguing that over-deterrence should be no concern with regards to intentional 
torts); Amelia J. Toy, Statutory Punitive Damage Caps and the Profit Motive: An Economic 
Perspective, 40 EMORY L.J. 303, 327 (1991) (“[S]ociety’s concern with intentional [torts] is 
not that there will be less of the activity than desired (such is not possible), but that there will 
instead be more of the activity than desired . . . .”). 
175
 Twerski & Sebok, supra note 163, at 1381 (quoting Malone, supra note 22, at 60). 
176
 Judge Posner describes “real” intentional torts as those that resemble common law 
crimes and do not involve a conflict between legitimate and productive activities but rather a 
coerced transfer of wealth to the defendant.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
LAW 227 (5th ed. 1998).  Other paradigmatic real intentional torts that routinely present 
uncertainties as to the extent of damages include theft of trade secrets and possibly “hard core” 
antitrust violations such as price fixing.  See, e.g., Jon Chally, Note, The Law of Trade Secrets: 
Toward a More Efficient Approach, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1269, 1295 n.113 (2004) (“Both in 
form and in substance misappropriation of trade secrets should be treated as a ‘real’ intentional 
tort.  One who misappropriates a [trade] secret does not do so inadvertently while conducting 
otherwise socially advantageous behavior.”); Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust “Treble” 
Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 115, 116 (1993) (arguing that treble 
damages, to compensate for detection problems, are at least appropriate in cases of “per se, 
‘hard core’” offenses).  The availability of treble damages is already a mechanism that 
compensates for the problems that are posed by uncertainties as to the extent of damages.   
177
 See Behrens v. Wometco Enters., Inc., 118 F.R.D. 534, 542 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (“[P]roof 
of damages in a securities fraud case is always difficult and requires expert testimony . . . .”).  
Although this article has previously discussed experts testifying to causation, experts testifying 
to the extent of damages are in the same genre and therefore can be treated similarly under the 
moving bar approach.  The primary difference between the two classes of experts is that the 
exclusion of the former will usually sink a plaintiff’s case, whereas the exclusion of the latter 
will only reduce the plaintiff’s potential recovery if liability is found.   
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present, and how the “moving bar” approach might make a difference, is Kaufman v. 
Motorola, Inc.178   
Kaufman involved a class action brought by Motorola shareholders alleging that 
Motorola executives had both concealed the true nature of Motorola’s inventory and 
had made misleading public statements regarding the inventory in order to artificially 
inflate the price of the stock.179  The class alleged that Motorola executives sold off 
their shares at a profit after they publicly disclosed the problems with Motorola’s 
inventory, resulting in a sharp stock decline.180  In order to establish the extent of its 
damages, the class sought to admit the expert testimony of Dr. Gregg A. Jarrell, an 
economics scholar and former chief economist of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.  Dr. Jarrell was prepared to testify to the class’s aggregate, as opposed 
to per share, damages, which he arrived at by “multiplying the alleged per share 
price differential by the aggregate number of shares that were ‘damaged’ by the 
alleged fraud.”181  In order to determine the aggregate number of shares that were 
“damaged,” Dr. Jarrell used the so-called “proportional trading model.”182  
According to Dr. Jarrell, the aggregate number of “damaged shares” could not be 
ascertained without the use of modeling because some of the shares purchased 
between the time of the fraudulent misstatements and the discovery thereof would 
have been purchased by short traders and other specialists not included in the 
plaintiff class.183   
Motorola challenged Dr. Jarrell’s proposed testimony on the ground that the 
proportional trading model was not sufficiently reliable under Daubert, and the trial 
court agreed.184  Though stating that “[t]here is no question that Dr. Jarrell is a highly 
qualified economist,” and that his “expertise was . . . clearly demonstrated to the 
court by his cogent explanation of the proportional trading model and its application 
to the facts of this case,”185 the court nevertheless determined that the model failed 
Daubert:   
At first blush, the conclusion that the proportional trading model does 
not pass Daubert muster may appear to implicate the “flat earth” theory, 
under which one could assume that the first person to conclude that the 
world was round would have been considered heretically unscientific.  
The difference, of course, is that the “round earth” theory was subject to 
testing, and proven correct.  Perhaps without such proof, the first person 
to conclude that the world was round would not have been allowed to so 
                                                                
178
 Kaufman v. Motorola, Inc., No. 95 C 1069, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14627 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 21, 2000). 
179
 Id. at *4. 
180
 Id. 
181
 Id. at *3. 
182
 Id. 
183
 Id. at *4. 
184
 Id. at *2-*3, *6-*7. 
185
 Id. at *4-*5. 
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testify before a jury if Daubert had been the law of what ever land that 
person lived in. 
In the instant case, Dr. Jarrell testified that there was no way to 
actually test the reliability of the proportional trading model.  Whether 
this is correct or not, in absence of such testing and in absence of any 
acceptance by the professional economists of the theory, it simply does 
not pass Daubert muster.186 
The court’s language makes its Daubert conclusion appear simple and virtually 
ineluctable.  However, the admissibility of statistical models for use in calculating 
aggregate damages in securities fraud cases was, and still is, a “hot button issue,” and 
several courts have allowed the use of such modeling to estimate aggregate class 
damages.187  The proportional trading model was not remotely archetypal “junk 
science,” and yet the trial court’s analysis suggests that it viewed the admissibility 
question as a rather easy one. 
The Kaufman court’s analysis is typical of the static bar approach because there 
is not a hint of substantive tort policy considerations in the court’s analysis.  The 
outcome might have been different had a moving bar approach been employed: A 
jury finding of fraud was a prerequisite to the imposition of compensatory damages, 
and the optimal occurrence rate of such securities fraud is arguably zero.188  Thus, 
concerns with potential over-deterrence should have been either reduced or non-
existent.189  Moreover, although deeming Dr. Jarrell inadmissible did not preclude 
either liability or a damage award, it likely had a significant effect on the extent of 
                                                                
186
 Id. at *6-*7. 
187
 See Richard Bemporad & I. Scott Bieler, Use of Experts in Securities Litigation, 1386 
PLI/Corp 645 (2003) (collecting cases).  
188
 See, e.g., Paul G. Mohoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal 
Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 647 (1992). 
189
 Whether private 10b-5 actions might pose over-deterrence risks is currently a matter of 
scholarly debate and is beyond the scope of this paper.  See, e.g., Amanda M. Rose, Reforming 
Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private 
Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (2008) (arguing that the threat of 10b-5 
liability might overdeter issuers, who face strict liability for the frauds of their agents).  More 
broadly, excessive corporate liability for the actions of rogue employees might result in the 
corporation adopting socially inefficient precautionary measures, such as preventative 
monitoring of employees.  See Coffee, supra note 173, at 196.  In addition, one could argue 
that the degree to which an actor is exposed to potential securities fraud penalties has an 
inverse relationship to the actor’s willingness to provide even accurate securities-related 
information to the public.  The moving bar approach would, of course, allow a trial court to 
take all of these things into consideration.  As with many securities fraud cases, however, the 
conduct at issue in Kaufman involved both scienter and the highest echelons of Motorola’s 
management.  See generally Kaufman v. Motorola, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P90, 481 
(N.D. Ill. April 16, 1999).  Both factors diminish any over-deterrence concern.  See Coffee, 
supra note 173, at 230 (arguing that where criminal behavior occurs within a corporation’s 
senior levels, “then society should use penalties designed to prohibit, not price,” because “we 
are again confronting behavior that lacks social utility, not the question how heavily to tax the 
corporation in order to induce monitoring.”). 
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the damages that Motorola would be forced to pay if found liable.190  For all of these 
reasons, a moving bar approach might have counseled the trial court to relax its 
demands on Dr. Jarrell, and it might have tipped the balance in the plaintiff’s favor. 
B.  Cases Involving Knowing Violations of Criminal or Regulatory Provisions that 
Possibly have Resulted in Unintended Injuries to Unintended Victims 
Cases involving intentional wrongdoing arguably present reduced or non-existent 
concerns with over-deterrence.  Under a moving bar approach, in such a case a trial 
court might lower the reliability bar for a plaintiff’s expert’s proffer on causation.  
Under the prevailing static bar approach, however, the fact that the defendant’s 
potentially injurious conduct involved a knowing violation of a criminal statute or 
regulatory provision is irrelevant to the reliability analysis.   
Knowing and intentional violations of a discrete criminal statute or regulatory 
provision thus provide another useful context in which to examine the difference 
between the static bar and moving bar approaches.191   Although such conduct often 
involves intentional harm, in many cases the causation question is with respect to 
unintentional harm to unintended victims.192  Consider the case Dellinger v. Pfizer 
Inc.193  Charles Dellinger underwent back surgery in 1994, and then again in 1996.194  
After the second surgery, he complained to his physician that he was experiencing 
extreme pain.  His physician “told [him] about a new drug for pain management 
which had come highly recommended.”195  The drug was Neurontin, an FDA 
approved drug for the treatment of epilepsy.  On September 19, 1996, Dellinger’s 
physician prescribed Neurontin for the treatment of his pain, a use that was “off-
label.”196 
Dellinger took Neurontin for the next eight months, at which point his physician 
“took him off [the drug] because the medicine did not appear to be helping 
[Dellinger’s] pain.”197  Dellinger was placed on another prescription drug, doxepin.  
However, at the end of July 1997, Dellinger’s physician discontinued the doxepin 
                                                                
190
 Without Dr. Jarrell’s testimony, the jury could only have been asked to find the amount 
of “per share” damages.  Class members would then have to file individual compensation 
claims after the fact.  Of course, it is unlikely that every class member would ultimately file 
such a claim, either because of lack of knowledge or transaction costs.  Thus, the 
inadmissibility of Dr. Jarrell’s testimony almost certainly reduced Motorola’s exposure.  That 
is, the court’s admissibility decision gave Motorola a better chance of getting away with its 
alleged fraud more cheaply. 
191
 Such violations are distinct from negligence per se, which does not require a showing 
of specific intent.   
192
 Criminal dumping of chemical or other pollutants into a river or other water source is a 
typical example. 
193
 Dellinger v. Pfizer Inc., No. 5:03CV95, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96355 (W.D.N.C. July 
19, 2006).   
194
 Id. at *2. 
195
 Id. 
196
 Id. at *3. 
197
 Id. at *4. 
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and re-prescribed Neurontin because Dellinger’s pain was worse.  On August 27, 
1997, Dellinger was also prescribed Duract as an additional pain medication, and in 
late November 1997, he was also prescribed Prozac to counteract depression.198 
In early 1998, Dellinger “began to experience severe lethargy, weakness, 
malaise, nausea and a metallic taste in his mouth.”199  On March 18, 1998, Dellinger 
was admitted to the Frye Regional Medical Center in Hickory, North Carolina, 
where he was diagnosed with pneumonia.  Dellinger’s medical records were 
“unclear” as to whether he also had pancreatitis.200  “At the time . . . [Dellinger] was 
taking Neurontin, Prozac, Soma, Vicodin, and Elavil.”201  Doctors took him off all of 
his medication when he was admitted.202  The next day, Dellinger was placed in the 
Intensive Care Unit (“ICU”) and the following day he was placed on a ventilator; 
Dellinger remained on life support for the next two weeks.203   
While Dellinger was in the ICU, his wife was “approached by Dr. Matt Brown . . 
. who advised her that she should question the use of Neurontin by her husband . . . 
.”
204
  On April 7th, Dellinger improved and was discharged from the ICU.  He was 
ultimately discharged from the hospital on April 23rd and discharged from his 
rehabilitation facility on April 28th.205   
Upon his discharge from the rehabilitation facility, Dellinger refused to continue 
taking Neurontin, though he continued to take Vicodin, Prozac, and Elavil.206  
Although his health gradually improved, it would be over a year before Dellinger 
was “able to feed, bathe, and care for himself.”207 
In 2003, Dellinger’s wife learned of reports that Pfizer and Parke-Davis, a 
division of Pfizer’s subsidiary Warner-Lambert, “had developed a well-designed and 
extensive scheme to promote Neurontin as an ‘off-label’ drug.”208  The scheme 
                                                                
198
 Id.  Dellinger’s physician discontinued the Duract in November 1997 because it caused 
Dellinger bouts of diarrhea.  Id. at *4 n.5. 
199
 Id. at *5. 
200
 Id. 
201
 Id. 
202
 Id. 
203
 Id. 
204
 Id. at *5-*6. 
205
 Id. at *6. 
206
 Id. at *6-*7.  
207
 Id. at *7. 
208
 Id.  In 2004, Pfizer “agreed to pay [the government] more than $430 million to resolve 
criminal charges and civil liabilities in connection with the promotion and marketing of 
Neurontin,” and Warner-Lambert “plead guilty to two counts of violating the [Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetics Act]” and paid a criminal fine of $240 million.  Marc J. Scheineson & Shannon 
Thyme Klinger, Lessons from Expanded Government Enforcement Efforts Against Drug 
Companies, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 9 (2005).  When Warner-Lambert’s criminal plea was 
announced, the Department of Justice described the company’s scheme as a “widespread, 
coordinated national effort to implement an off-label marketing plan” and stated that the 
company  
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included the hiring of “medical liaisons” who were “trained to use knowingly false 
information about Neurontin’s ‘off-label’ uses when speaking with doctors and were 
told to lie about their credentials.”209  Moreover, the liaisons “engaged in repetitive 
distribution of non-scientific, anecdotal data designed to convince physicians that 
‘off-label’ uses of Neurontin were safe and effective.”210 
Dellinger subsequently sued Pfizer and Parke-Davis.  Dellinger claimed (1) that 
he would not have been prescribed Neurontin but for this illegal promotion of the 
drug as a pain medication, and (2) that Neurontin caused the illness that resulted in 
his being hospitalized for months and debilitated for over a year.211  The defendants 
moved, inter alia, to exclude under Daubert the testimony of Dellinger’s expert that 
Neurontin was the cause of his injuries.212   
Dellinger’s causation expert was Christopher Keeys, a clinical pharmacist with a 
degree in pharmacy.213  Dr. Keeys proposed “to testify that [Neurontin] was 
‘probably the offending agent, and in the absence of medical etiologies, [the] cause 
of [Dellinger’s] acute pancreatitis and subsequent complications . . . including [his] 
respiratory illness.’”214   
The trial court deemed Keeys’ testimony inadmissible.  Although the court 
deemed Keeys unqualified to speak to the question of causation because he lacked a 
degree in pharmacology, the court alternatively determined that the substance of 
Keeys’ opinion was not reliable “based upon the factors set out in Daubert,”215 thus 
implying that Keeys’ opinion would have been inadmissible even if he had been a 
pharmacologist.   
Keeys had based his opinion on “product labels and data available from the 
FDA’s adverse drug reaction reporting system . . . , published biomedical literature 
related to drugs associated with acute pancreatitis, product inserts and additional data 
regarding unpublished reports of acute pancreatitis, and a lack of positive re-
challenge with reinstated medications in [Dellinger].”216  The trial court found 
                                                          
decided not to seek FDA approval for any of the [off-label] uses because it was 
concerned that approval for any of the non-epilepsy uses would allow generic 
competitors of Neurontin, which was expected to go off-patent soon, to compete with 
a “son of Neurontin” drug that Warner-Lambert hoped to have approved by the FDA 
for both epilepsy and non-epilepsy uses.   
Department of Justice Release, Warner-Lambert to Pay $430 Million to Resolve Criminal & 
Civil Health Care Liability Relating to Off-Label Promotion, (May 13, 2004) available at 
www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/May/04_civ_322.htm (noting that Warner-Lambert 
“aggressively” promoted Neurontin for, inter alia, “the treatment of . . . various pain 
disorders.”). 
209
 Dellinger, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96355, at *8. 
210
 Id. 
211
 Id. at *9-*10.  
212
 Id. at *25. 
213
 Id. at *25-*26. 
214
 Id. at *26 (quoting Plaintiff’s Exhibit F). 
215
 Id. at *28.  
216
 Id. at *29.  The “lack of positive re-challenge” referred to the fact that Dellinger’s 
health had improved after he ceased taking Neurontin.  This allowed Keeys to “rule in” 
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Keeys’ opinion failed Daubert’s test for reliability.  The court held that the adverse 
event reports had not been peer-reviewed and “fail[ed] to test a causal hypothesis.”217  
As for Neurontin’s labeling and package insert, which listed pancreatitis as a 
potential side effect, the court held that these were merely “regulatory document[s] 
that [were] generated from science and a collaboration of the industry with the 
FDA.”218   Because “Keeys’ opinion regarding the temporal relationship between 
[Dellinger] taking Neurontin and becoming ill was never tested independently or by 
objective sources,” the court held that his opinion that “Neurontin causes pancreatitis 
[or pneumonia was] not supported by medical or scientific literature.”219 
By the time that the Dellinger court ruled on the defendants’ Daubert challenge 
of Keeys, Warner-Lambert already had pleaded guilty to multiple criminal violations 
relating to its marketing of Neurontin.220  Indeed, the Dellinger court found that a 
jury could have concluded that Dellinger would not have been prescribed Neurontin 
as an off-label pain medication were it not for Warner-Lambert’s illegal scheme.221  
Warner-Lambert’s illegal actions—which included providing false and misleading 
information to doctors regarding Neurontin’s off-label efficacy222—exposed 
Dellinger to dangerous side effects from an inappropriately prescribed drug, which is 
precisely the type of harm that the federal off-label promotion statutes are in part 
designed to protect patients against. 
The defendants in Dellinger ostensibly made no attempt to demonstrate through 
expert evidence that Neurontin was not capable of causing pancreatitis or 
pneumonia.  Thus, it is plain that the trial court based its decision on the view that 
Dellinger’s expert had not established a sufficiently reliable basis for the conclusion 
that there had been a causal connection in Dellinger’s case.  In other words, though 
there remained an uncertainty whether Neurontin was capable of causing Dellinger’s 
injuries and whether it did in fact cause Dellinger’s injuries, the trial court did not 
appear to relax at all Dellinger’s burden of resolving that uncertainty, even in light of 
Warner-Lambert’s earlier admission of criminal misconduct.  More generally, 
Warner-Lambert’s underlying conduct did not even play a supporting role in the trial 
court’s resolution of the admissibility question.  The Dellinger court’s analysis was 
thus an archetypal static bar approach.   
                                                          
Neurontin as the cause of Dellinger’s maladies while “ruling out” the other medications that 
Dellinger continued to take.  This is commonly referred to as “differential diagnosis” or 
“differential etiology.”  See, e.g., Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 262-63 
(4th Cir. 1999) (“Differential diagnosis, or differential etiology, is a standard scientific 
technique of identifying the cause of a medical problem by eliminating the likely causes until 
the most probable one is isolated.”). 
217
 Dellinger, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 96355, at *29. 
218
 Id. at *31. 
219
 Id. at *32, *34. 
220
 Id. at *9.  
221
 Id. at *23-*24.  
222
 Department of Justice Release, supra note 208 (“[Warner-Lamber]’s agents . . . made 
false or misleading statements to health care professionals regarding Neurontin’s efficacy and 
whether it had been approved by the FDA for the off-label uses.”). 
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Now, to be sure, the criminal and civil penalties that Pfizer and Warner-Lambert 
paid as part of its settlement with the Department of Justice in 2005 might have 
represented a total disgorgement of the profits that the companies made through the 
illegal marketing scheme for Neurontin.  Thus, it could be argued that tort liability 
for personal injuries that Neurontin might have caused to patients that would not 
have received the drug but for the illegal marketing schemes are not necessary to 
ensure optimal deterrence.  However, this assumes that the government will obtain a 
high, if not perfect, level of detection and enforcement of similar illegal marketing 
schemes and that the public penalties will represent a full disgorgement.  These 
assumptions are probably not empirically sound.223   
To the extent that Dellinger is typical of the decision that one could expect going 
forward in similar cases, it skews a pharmaceutical company’s decision whether to 
engage in illegal marketing schemes ex ante.  Under Dellinger, where the causal 
connection between adverse events and the drug are plausible but not yet proven 
epidemiologically, the pharmaceutical company will not face liability for the 
personal injury damages its illegal marketing may cause.  Dellinger virtually ensures 
that companies that engage in illegal marketing schemes will be able to avoid fully 
internalizing the costs of the personal injuries that their schemes cause.  Thus, if a 
company faces only disgorgement of profits derived from the illegal scheme and not 
the externalized injuries suffered by patients, it will undertake the scheme so long as 
the probability of full disgorgement is less than one,224 even though the social cost of 
its scheme exceeds its ill-gotten gains.225 
It might be argued that whether Dellinger results in economically inefficient 
under-deterrence of violations of the off-label promotion statutes depends on 
whether those statutes themselves are economically efficient.226  Alternatively, it 
might be argued that the knowing evasion of a legislatively-enacted statute 
(particularly one designed to ensure public safety) always or presumptively lacks 
social utility and that therefore over-deterrence of such knowing evasions should not 
be a concern.227  Whichever view is taken, the important point is that a moving bar 
                                                                
223
 See George S. Craft, Jr., Note, Promoting Off-Label in Pursuit of Profit: An 
Examination of a Fraudulent Business Model, 8 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 103, 122 (2007) 
(“[T]he overall financial gains resulting from [the illegal marketing of Neurontin] . . . 
dwarf[ed] the $430 million global settlement.”).  
224
 Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 223 (1976). 
225
 In the case of Neurontin, the evidence was strong that the drug was responsible for at 
least some of the occurrences of pneumonia in patients using the drug.  In fact, based on 
adverse event data from all Neurontin clinical trials, pneumonia already had been identified as 
a “frequent” adverse event experienced in patients taking the drug.  See FDA Approved 
Labeling Text, February 2005, www.fda.gov/medWatch/SAFETY/2005/Feb_PI/Neurontin 
_PI.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2008). 
226
 This is a topic that is beyond the scope of this Article. 
227
 Warner-Lambert’s violation of the off-label promotion statutes with regard to 
Neurontin was not only knowing, but it was also accompanied by the feeding of knowingly 
false and misleading information to doctors who prescribed the drugs to their patients.  This 
type of statutory violation is less likely to serve any social utility.  Cf. David A. Barker, 
Environmental Crimes, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Civil/Criminal Line, 88 VA. L. REV. 
1387, 1426-28 (2002) (arguing that criminal enforcement should “focus on the violator who 
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approach would have allowed the trial court in Dellinger to consider whether the 
illegal nature of the defendant’s possibly injurious conduct militates in favor of a 
lower reliability bar for the plaintiff’s causation expert because concerns with over-
deterrence are reduced.  That is, the trial court would have been allowed to determine 
that, in light of the nature of the defendant’s possibly injurious conduct, erring on the 
side of potential excessive liability228 made more sense than erring on the side of 
under-deterrence, and therefore Dellinger’s expert would have been scrutinized a bit 
less at the admissibility stage.229  In Dellinger, this might have made the difference 
between the plaintiff losing at summary judgment or, instead, surviving the 
defendant’s Daubert challenge and getting to the jury.  
C.  Cases Involving Injuries Possibly Causally Connected to Consumer Products 
that Possess Questionable Social Utility 
This subsection discusses the use of a moving bar approach to adjust the 
reliability bar downward and the likelihood that it will become more controversial 
and tricky: cases involving injuries possibly causally connected to consumer 
products that possess questionable social utility.  In the context of pharmaceuticals, 
Professors Berger and Twerski have referred to such products as “lifestyle drugs,” 
defined by the fact that they offer “little therapeutic value.”230 
                                                          
misleads the government and undermines the regulatory system through fraud, deception, or 
denial”). 
228
 By “excessive liability” the author means liability that exceeds the probabilistic harm 
that the defendant’s conduct caused.  For example, suppose that Neurontin caused a 20% 
increase in the occurrence of pneumonia among patients who were inappropriately prescribed 
the drug as a result of Warner-Lambert’s illegal marketing scheme.  Suppose further that every 
one of these patients sued Warner-Lambert and that juries ultimately found in favor of 50% of 
them.  If this occurred, then Warner-Lambert’s damages would be 2.5 times the probabilistic 
harm for which it was responsible. 
229
 Adjusting the reliability bar downward in Dellinger seems intuitively correct from the 
perspective of fairness as well.  Warner-Lambert’s underlying conduct was not merely 
violative of the off-label promotion statutes; its conduct interfered with the relationship 
between Dellinger and his physician.  Warner-Lambert’s conduct was thus wrongful vis-à-vis 
Dellinger even if Neurontin was not the cause of Dellinger’s physical injuries.  When viewed 
in this way, Dellinger’s personal injury lawsuit against Pfizer presented solely a question of 
the extent of the damages Dellinger suffered as a result of Warner-Lambert’s illegal scheme.  
“The most elementary conceptions of justice and public policy require that the wrongdoer 
shall bear the risk of the uncertainty which his own wrong has created.”  Bigelow v. RKO 
Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946) (calling the principle “an ancient one”).  
230
 Berger & Twerski, supra note 130, at 268.  I do not agree with Professor Berger’s and 
Professor Twerski’s characterization of certain products as “lifestyle drugs.”  For instance, 
their categorization of Bendectin as a lifestyle drug ignores the fact that morning sickness can 
often pose a serious risk to fetal health.  See University of Illinois Medical Center: Health 
Library, Morning Sickness, http://uimc.discoveryhospital.com/main.php?id=2064 (last visited 
Aug. 31, 2008) (“Prolonged morning sickness can cause weight loss, dehydration, salt 
imbalances, and malnutrition.  If these are not treated, they can lead to liver, kidney, heart, and 
brain damage to the mother and the fetus . . . . Severe morning sickness, or hyperemesis 
gravidarum, can cause low birth weight and fetal growth retardation.  The blood flow to the 
placenta and fetus is also decreased[.]  Less oxygen and nutrients are delivered to the baby.  
Low birth weight is often linked with poorer mental function and reduced overall health of the 
baby.”). 
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One reason that a moving bar approach is likely to be more controversial and 
more tricky in this context is because it can be difficult to distinguish between 
consumer products with high social utility and those whose social utility is low or 
perhaps even non-existent.  However, it seems obvious that certain products offer 
more potential benefits than others.  For example, a vaccine that guards effectively 
against a serious virus seems clearly to possess greater social utility than an 
unregulated dietary supplement that claims to increase metabolism.  Assume that the 
vaccine has a social value of $100 per inoculation, while the dietary supplement has 
a social value of $1 per person who takes it.  If both products carry a one percent risk 
of causing a harm of $200, from an economic perspective the vaccine is net efficient 
($98 net value per inoculation) while the dietary supplement is net inefficient (-$1 
net value per person who takes it).   
A regulator seeking economic efficiency would prohibit sales of the dietary 
supplement, but not the vaccine despite the fact that the two products pose the exact 
same risk of harm.231  But, for a variety of reasons, oftentimes ex ante regulatory 
decisions do not achieve economic efficiency, and risk-causing behavior is 
sometimes unregulated or under-regulated.232  This is where the tort system steps in. 
The “all-or-nothing, more probable than not” standard hampers the tort system’s 
ability to achieve optimal deterrence, however.233  Comparing an important vaccine 
with an unregulated dietary supplement that offers minimal appreciable health 
benefits is again a useful exercise.  Suppose that in a given population 100 people are 
expected to suffer from disease X, which causes each afflicted person a loss of $200.  
Suppose further that both a highly effective vaccine against H1N1 influenza and an 
objectively valueless (but creatively marketed), unregulated dietary supplement are 
both associated with a one percent increase in this background rate of disease X.  
Finally, suppose that for both the vaccine and the supplement the evidence of the 
causal connection to disease X is of the same quality and quantity. 
In a lawsuit against either the manufacturer of the vaccine or the dietary 
supplement, the plaintiff suffering from disease X will have the burden to show that 
it is more probable than not that the defendant’s product caused his disease.  The 
plaintiff will need to introduce an expert willing to testify to this.  For the plaintiff to 
withstand summary judgment, he or she will have to first withstand the defendant’s 
Daubert challenge.  The defendant’s challenge will predictably argue that the 
expert’s causation opinion is inherently unreliable given that the defendant’s product 
is associated only with a paltry one percent increase in the background disease rate.   
                                                                
231
 In a perfect functioning market, regulation would not be necessary.  Instead, rational 
consumers would choose to avoid the dietary supplement.  However, information asymmetries 
and other market failures militate against such a free market approach.  See generally Jon D. 
Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market 
Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999).  Even a perfect Pigovian tax requires 
consumers to accurately assess the utility of a product in order for the market to order 
consumer choices perfectly.  
232
 See Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 
CORNELL L. REV. 773, 840 n.247 (1997) (reviewing briefly scholarship addressing causes of 
regulatory failure in the context of mass torts). 
233
 See generally Rosenberg, supra note 109. 
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If the trial court excludes the plaintiff’s expert, then the defendant will escape all 
liability even though there is a probabilistic harm of $2 associated with its product 
(.01 multiplied by $200).  If, however, the trial court were to admit the evidence and 
allow the plaintiff to get to the jury, the defendant potentially could face liability of 
$200 for each of the 101 plaintiffs who took the defendant’s product and 
subsequently were diagnosed with disease X.  Even if juries found for the plaintiff 
only ten percent of the time, the manufacturers of the products would be faced with 
liability far exceeding the probabilistic harm of their products. 
Under the “all-or-nothing” liability rule, a trial court deciding whether to exclude 
the evidence and dismiss the case on the one hand, or to admit the expert evidence 
and send the case to the jury on the other, has a choice: Err on the side of under-
deterrence (exclude and dismiss despite probabilistic harm of $2) or err on the side 
of over-deterrence by exposing the defendant to potential “crushing liability” 234 of 
$200.  There is simply no way around this. 
The moving bar approach counsels that, in making its admissibility 
determination, the trial court should not decide between under- or over-deterrence in 
a vacuum.  Rather, it should consider the nature of the defendant’s potentially 
injurious conduct.  In the disease X hypothetical described above, assuming that the 
defendant did not mislead consumers, violate any regulatory provisions, or otherwise 
act fraudulently in selling its product, the court should consider the social utility of 
the defendant’s product.  The court should lower the reliability bar in the lawsuit 
against the dietary supplement manufacturer and use a substantially higher bar in a 
lawsuit against the vaccine manufacturer.  It is easy to see why: The probabilistic 
harm of the dietary supplement is $2 (.01 multiplied by $200), the social utility of the 
product is $0.  Exposing the manufacturer of the dietary supplement to excessive tort 
liability does not result in inefficient over-deterrence.235  With the vaccine, on the 
other hand, the product is clearly net socially efficient.  Accordingly, ensuring that 
the manufacturer does not face excessive liability is a critical concern.  Although 
precluding any tort recovery against the manufacturer of the vaccine would allow the 
manufacturer to avoid internalizing the probabilistic harm that its product causes 
($2), the negative consequences of this are far outweighed by the negative 
consequences that excessive liability might cause, namely, the removal of the 
vaccine from the market.  Moreover, if a court admitted the causation evidence 
against the vaccine manufacturer, it would send a signal to manufacturers of similar 
products with possible harmful side effects that they might also face crushing 
liability.  Such manufacturers may withdraw their products from the market (or never 
bring them to market in the first place) despite the fact that the benefits outweigh the 
probabilistic harms associated with them.236 
                                                                
234
 By “crushing liability,” the author means liability that greatly exceeds the probabilistic 
harm caused by the conduct in question.  
235
 Although plaintiffs would stand to gain a windfall, there is no concern with over-
deterring the manufacturer of the dietary supplement because the product already is socially 
inefficient.   
236
 This essentially is what happened with Bendectin, the drug at issue in Daubert, as well 
as the DPT vaccine.  See W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. 
L. REV. 547, 584 (2000).  
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Few cases will be as straightforward as the stylized disease X hypothetical above.  
For example, if the dietary supplement created $5 in additional social value for each 
person who took it, then the product would be net socially efficient (assuming it was 
not associated with harms other than disease X, of course).  What if the court is not 
sure of the supplement’s per-use social value but thinks it is between $1 and $5—
should the court err on the side of over-deterrence or under-deterrence?  It is not the 
intent of this Article to provide answers to questions such as these.  Rather, it is 
enough to point out that a court focused on economic deficiency might find it 
appropriate to lower the reliability bar in cases involving products with less social 
utility and raise it in cases involving products with greater social utility. 
This is not what courts are doing under the Daubert/Joiner mode of analysis, 
however.  The case Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc.,237 involved a products liability 
suit against the manufacturer of diet pills containing fenfluramine-phentermine, 
(“fen-phen”).  In Linnen, the decedent died of primary pulmonary hypertension 
(PPH) at age 30.  The decedent had been diagnosed with PPH shortly after taking the 
defendant’s diet pills for a period of three weeks.238  The defendant argued in several 
pre-trial motions that there was no evidence linking the ingredients contained in its 
diet pills to PPH.239   
The plaintiff, however, sought to introduce the testimony of Dr. Paul Wellman to 
prove causation.240  Dr. Wellman was “a Professor of Psychology at Texas A & M 
University . . . who [had studied] the pharmacological and neurochemical bases of 
anorexia induced by appetite suppressant drugs.  [He had] lectured and published on 
neurochemical and pharmacological mechanisms by which appetite suppressants 
reduce eating in animals.”241  Dr. Wellman testified that, in his expert opinion, the 
diet pills taken by the decedent had caused or contributed to the development of her 
PPH.  He based his opinion on the following: First, clinical case studies collectively 
suggested an association between ingestion of fen-phen and PPH.  Second, appetite 
suppressants with chemical structures similar to the defendant’s diet pills have been 
shown to increase serotonin levels, and increased serotonin levels have been shown 
to cause or be “likely risk factors of” PPH.242   
Dr. Wellman also “relie[d] on a variety of materials, including case reports [of 
adverse events], studies of other drugs that are pharmacologically related to 
phentermine, studies of the physiological effects of serotonin on animals, and an 
article he co-authored with Dr. Timothy Maher of the Massachusetts College of 
Pharmacy and Health Sciences” that was peer-reviewed and “published in the 
International Journal of Obesity in 1999.”243   
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 Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., No. CIV. A. 97-2307, 2000 WL 16769 (Mass. Super. 
Dec. 14, 1999). 
238
 Id. at *1. 
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 Id. at *2-*3. 
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Reviewing Dr. Wellman’s expert opinion atomistically, the court held that it was 
unreliable and inadmissible.  The court first concluded that Dr. Wellman’s reliance 
on the adverse event case reports was not scientifically reliable:  
Case reports cannot be relied upon to establish association or causation 
between exposure and disease because they do not include control groups. 
The absence of a control group makes it impossible to determine whether 
the occurrence of the disease in a reported individual is attributable to the 
exposure or whether it would have occurred in the individual even absent 
the exposure.244   
With regard to the scientific studies showing that fen-phen caused an increase in 
serotonin levels, the court noted that Dr. Wellman had relied on animal studies in 
forming this conclusion.  These animal studies involved mice that were given doses 
of phentermine well above the dosage level given to humans.245  Quoting the 
defendant’s expert’s critique of Dr. Wellman’s opinion, the court stated, “animal 
studies have limited applicability to humans due to important differences between 
animals and humans, including differences in the bodies’ reactions to a drug.”246  The 
court also rejected the reliability of Dr. Wellman’s assumption that increased 
serotonin levels are a risk factor of PPH.  The court agreed with the defendant’s 
expert that it is improper to rely on theories about the biological mechanism by 
which a disease is triggered when no epidemiological studies support the 
hypothesis.247 
Ultimately, the court held that Dr. Wellman’s testimony was unreliable and 
inadmissible under Daubert.  The fact that a peer-reviewed journal had earlier 
published a paper that Dr. Wellman authored proposing the existence of a link 
between PPH and fen-phen was not enough to save Dr. Wellman’s opinion.248  The 
court held that the lack of sufficient testing of Dr. Wellman’s theory, its failure to 
obtain general acceptance of the theory in the scientific community, and Dr. 
Wellman’s heavy reliance on animal studies was fatal to his opinion’s admissibility.  
In a telling passage, the court summarized its criticism of Dr. Wellman’s testimony 
by pointing to the differences between legal certainty and scientific certainty: 
Dr. Wellman acknowledges that he holds certain critical opinions in this 
case with less than a reasonable degree of scientific certainty.  Those 
opinions include whether phentermine causes primary pulmonary 
hypertension, whether phentermine in combination with fenfluramine 
increases the risk of developing pulmonary hypertension, whether an 
increase in seratonin levels causes pulmonary hypertension, and whether 
phentermine alone increases seratonin levels.   
                                                                
244
 Id. at *3 (quoting defendant’s expert). 
245
 Id. at *3-*4. 
246
 Id. at *5 (quoting defendant’s expert). 
247
 Id. at *11. 
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 See id. at *5. 
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The parties agree that an expert should be able to testify “to a reasonable 
degree of scientific certainty,” but they dispute what constitutes that level 
of certainty.  Plaintiffs urge that, because this is a civil trial, the standard 
for the admissibility of expert testimony should be the civil standard of 
proof, variously expressed by plaintiffs as a preponderance of the 
evidence, more likely than not, or, expressed numerically, 51% . . . . 
. . . .  
. . . When a witness testifies as to the principles and methodologies 
applicable to a particular scientific field—what might be termed pure 
science—that witness must testify with reasonable scientific certainty. 
Reliability under the rationale of . . . Daubert requires no less before 
potentially critical expert testimony may come before the jury . . . .  
. . . Although an expert’s opinion as to the application of science to the 
facts of a case may be offered on the basis of probability, reasonableness 
and likelihood, the scientific principles or knowledge on which those 
opinions are based must be held with a reasonable degree of scientific 
certainty.  That level of certainty, while it need not be absolute, must be 
greater than “more likely than not.”249 
The Linnen court’s analysis is, again, an archetypal static bar approach.  Nothing 
in the opinion remotely suggests that the court treated the height of the reliability bar 
as being any different than it would have been had the drug at issue been an FDA-
approved drug designed to treat serious illness.250  As suggested earlier in this 
subsection, this makes little sense from a deterrence perspective.  If the tort system is 
intended to further “society’s task [of selecting] those drugs with net beneficial 
health effects,”251 then a court’s reliability analysis should be altered to more 
resemble a regulatory risk assessment.  This is what the moving bar approach tries to 
move toward.252  
V.  CONCLUSION: SOME OBJECTIONS TO THE MOVING BAR APPROACH 
The author is under no illusions that the moving bar approach proposed is likely 
to raise a host of objections.  In this concluding section, the author offers brief 
responses to a few of the objections that might be raised: 
                                                                
249
 Id. at *12-*14. 
250
 The defendant’s product was neither FDA-approved nor designed as an obesity 
treatment.  Most users of the product turned to it in order to lose “those last few pounds.”  See 
Michael D. Lemonick, Dark Side of Diet Pills: Growing Reports of Serious Side Effects are 
Leading to Tough New Restrictions on Redux and Fen-Phen, TIME, Sept. 22, 1997, at 81. 
251
 Viscusi, supra note 236, at 585. 
252
 While this article has focused on circumstances in which the moving bar approach 
would counsel a trial court to adjust the reliability bar downward, in some cases it will counsel 
a court to raise the reliability bar even higher than Daubert purports to set it.   
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Objection #1: The moving bar approach has no support in the plain language of 
Rule 702. 
This objection is based upon a cramped reading of Rule 702.  Rule 702 provides: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
[qualified witness] may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) 
the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the 
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the 
case.253 
The rule’s focus on the “sufficiency” of the facts or data, and the “reliability” of the 
witness’s principles and methods and application thereof to the facts of the case do 
not foreclose a moving bar approach.  Rule 702’s key terms are “sufficient” and 
“reliable.”  These are relativistic terms,254 and they have been treated as such in other 
legal contexts.255   
The question, of course, is what factors to which the terms “sufficient” and 
“reliable” are relative.  Traditionally, courts deciding whether to allow a plaintiff to 
get to the jury demanded less evidence of a causal connection between defendant’s 
conduct and the plaintiff’s injury in cases where the defendant’s conduct was more 
reprehensible or otherwise warranted less protection from over-deterrence.256  In 
other words, in determining whether evidence was “sufficient” to get the plaintiff to 
the jury, the trial court took into account the nature of the defendant’s possibly 
injurious conduct.  The moving bar approach simply incorporates this well known 
practice into the admissibility stage: A “reliable” opinion is one that, if accepted by 
jurors, would result in an outcome that could be deemed an “acceptable” outcome 
from the perspective of, inter alia, optimal deterrence.257    
                                                                
253
 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
254
 See Imwinkelried, supra note 28, at 269-70.  
255
 For example, an anonymous witness’s tip may be deemed sufficiently reliable to justify 
a Terry stop, but not sufficiently reliable to procure a search warrant.  See Katherine 
Goldwasser, After Abscam: An Examination of Congressional Proposals to Limit Targeting 
Discretion in Federal Undercover Investigations, 36 EMORY L.J. 75, 134 (1987) (“[T]he test 
for reliability of informant information is more demanding under the probable cause standard 
than under the reasonable suspicion standard.”).  
256
 See supra text accompanying notes 20-21. 
257
 I do think that Rule 702’s plain language forecloses any approach to admissibility that 
would throw science out the window completely.  For example, no matter how reprehensible 
the defendant’s conduct, I do not think that Rule 702 would remotely contemplate letting a 
causation expert base her testimony on a Ouija board or a crystal ball.  At a minimum, I think 
Rule 702 would require that an expert’s methodology be consistent with the methodology that 
a regulatory risk-assessor would use, and that an expert should rely on the types of evidence 
upon which a regulatory risk-assessor would rely.  
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Objection #2: The moving bar approach inappropriately allows courts to engage in 
policymaking that should be reserved for regulatory agencies. 
Concededly, the moving bar approach assumes not only that the courts have 
some role in regulating activities that pose risks, but also that their decision-making 
processes should be sensitive to substantive tort policies such as deterrence.258  There 
is an ongoing debate whether regulatory policy-making is a task that should be left 
exclusively to legislatures and administrative agencies.259  Entering this debate is 
beyond the scope of this Article, but there are a couple of points that are worth 
making in summary form. 
First, commentators who object to courts engaging in regulatory policy-making 
argue that courts are neither electorally accountable nor particularly transparent.260  
However, most regulatory decisions are ultimately made by administrative agencies, 
as opposed to the legislature, and it is questionable whether administrative agencies 
are either significantly more democratically responsive or significantly more 
transparent than courts.  “[T]he political pressures on an agency will not necessarily 
reflect society’s preferences,” which tends to dilute its democratic responsiveness.261  
Commentators have also recognized that agencies are uniquely vulnerable to interest 
group capture, which tends to negate the benefits of agency expertise.262  Moreover, 
although a federal agency must allow “interested persons” the opportunity to 
comment on a proposed rule263 and must base its final decision on “substantial 
evidence” and justify the decision in writing,264 courts also allow (albeit in a more 
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 Certain steps could be taken to minimize the degree that courts make policy under the 
moving bar approach.  For example, if the nature of the defendant’s conduct was simply 
treated as a “thumb on the scale” in an otherwise close case, then the moving bar approach 
would not give a court extreme policy-making authority.   
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 See Charles J. Doane, Beyond Fear: Articulating a Modern Doctrine in Anticipatory 
Nuisance for Enjoining Improbable Threats of Catastrophic Harm, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
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whether courts should play an active role in the regulation of modern technological risk . . . . 
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whether administrative agencies are sensitive enough to the public interest in regulating such 
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quickly enough to new sources of risk created by sudden accelerations in scientific 
knowledge.”). 
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 See, e.g., The Honorable Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative 
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L. J. 511, 515 (1989); Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in 
the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 306-09 (1986). 
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 See, e.g.,  Jeffrey W. Stempel, A More Complete Look at Complexity, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 
781, 836 (1998). 
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 See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and 
Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 681 (2009) (“A shift 
from courts to agencies raises concerns about an agency’s comparatively greater vulnerability 
to capture by regulated parties.”). 
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 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006). 
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 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557. 
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limited fashion) interested persons to participate in the judicial process through amici 
filings.  Furthermore, the most important judicial decisions are accompanied by a 
detailed written opinion.       
Second, the administrative rule-making process tends to take years.  This is 
particularly true with respect to complex yet broadly important issues, such as 
whether a particular food or drug should be banned due to safety concerns.  Consider 
the FDA’s ban of ephedrine and ephedra-containing dietary supplements.  The 
FDA’s decision-making process began in June 1997.  It was not until December 30, 
2003 that the FDA issued its initial decision to ban ephedra, and it took until 
February 11, 2004 for the agency to issue its final rule.265  During this nearly seven 
year rule-making process, ephedra manufacturers engaged in a “fierce lobbying” 
effort, and at least one commentator has described the FDA as having “been 
extraordinarily slow in instituting the ban . . . .”266  Even if agencies do have an 
advantage over courts when it comes to regulatory expertise, this does not do much 
good if proposed regulations languish for years.  To the extent that speed in reducing 
potentially harmful behavior is important, arguably the judicial system is superior to 
agency rule-making.   
Third, while the threat of tort liability has the capacity to deter broadly, agency 
regulations have only the power to constrain narrowly.  To return to the ephedra 
example, the FDA’s ban on ephedra did not truly solve the public health problem 
that the agency was confronting.  Rather, manufacturers simply began to create and 
sell new products with ephedra-like effects (and ephedra-like dangers) that were not 
captured by the ephedra ban.267  The proposed moving bar approach would not be so 
easily evaded.   
Finally, while the proposed moving bar approach provides courts a role in the 
regulatory decision-making process, it does not provide courts with anything close to 
the equivalent of an administrative agency’s regulatory prerogative.  Indeed, in those 
instances where it eases the burden of admissibility, the moving bar approach 
actually transfers power from the court to the jury.  
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 See 69 Fed. Reg. 28,6788, 28,6789 (Feb. 11, 2004) (“The data do not indicate that 
[ephedra] products provide a health benefit sufficient to outweigh [the] risks [of stroke, heart 
attack, and death].”).  Notably, a year after the FDA’s decision, the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
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admitting the testimony of the plaintiffs’ causation expert.  Id. at 1238-59.  The court’s 
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Objection #3: The moving bar approach will lead to an across-the-board watering 
down of the reliability standard. 
This objection gets it backwards.  A static bar approach is more likely to result in 
an across-the-board watering down of the reliability standard.  It is plausible that 
courts confronted with sympathetic plaintiffs, such as those injured as a result of 
reprehensible conduct or by consumer products of questionable social utility, 
eventually will feel pressure to allow plaintiff’s with shaky causation evidence to 
present their cases to the jury.  Under a static bar approach, if courts begin to lower 
the reliability bar for these sympathetic plaintiffs, they will necessarily have 
suggested a lower bar in all cases.   
Under a moving bar approach, courts would have case-specific, idiosyncratic 
reasons for their particular admissibility decisions.  So, for example, in a case 
involving fen-phen, a court could admit an expert proffer based on animal studies 
without suggesting that reliance on animal studies would be sufficient in a case 
involving a valuable vaccine.   
In addition, a moving bar approach will in some cases warrant an even higher 
reliability bar.  Thus, the moving bar approach is not inherently “pro-plaintiff.”  
Rather, the approach seeks to move the tort system toward optimal deterrence in 
spite of an “all-or-nothing” rule that is in inherent tension with optimal deterrence. 
Objection #4: The moving bar approach will create windfalls for undeserving 
plaintiffs. 
Under a moving bar approach, some indeterminate plaintiffs will get to the jury 
when they would not have under a static bar approach.  And, some of these plaintiffs 
likely will receive compensation that exceeds the probabilistic harm caused by the 
defendant, which could be categorized as a windfall.  However, it is important to 
note that surviving a Daubert challenge and summary judgment does not mean that 
the plaintiff will prevail at trial.  Even in the most sympathetic of cases, plaintiffs 
with shaky causation evidence lose.  For example, in the Bendectin litigation, where 
the causation evidence was always quite weak, nearly sixty percent of juries ruled in 
favor of Merrell Dow.268  More recently, in the products liability litigation against 
Vioxx, which involved evidence of corporate wrong-doing on the part of Merck & 
Co., Inc., juries ruled in favor of plaintiffs in only fifty percent of cases.269   
Admitting expert evidence will therefore merely force the parties to the 
bargaining table.  Surviving a Daubert motion will obviously increase the settlement 
value of the plaintiff’s case from what it was prior to the Daubert hearing value.  
But, the settlement value will still have to take into account the possibility that the 
evidence, while good enough to be admitted, will not be good enough to persuade a 
jury.270  Ultimately, the valuation landscape may result in settlements that move 
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toward an accurate reflection of the statistical probability of a causal connection 
between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injuries. 
In the end, the moving bar approach is an attempt to ease some of the existing 
tension between the substantive tort policy of deterrence and the manner in which 
modern courts tend to evaluate the reliability of expert evidence.  This Article 
represents merely an opening in a renewed debate over how substantive tort policies 
can be integrated into the law of expert evidence. 
                                                          
begun to create a valuation landscape, and thus to provide a basis for negotiating 
settlements.”).  
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